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EQUITABLE EQUIVALENTS:
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE DOCTRINE OF
EQUIVALENTS AFTER WARNER-JENKINSON
CO. v. HILTON DAVIS CHEMICAL CO.*
Lawrence S. Graham**
In the wake of Hilton Davis, patent attorneys can be
assured that unless Congress intervenes, the main battle-
ground in 21st-century patent trials will continue to be
liability under the doctrine of equivalents.'
INTRODUCTION
Biotechnology2 is big business. In 1996, over 300 publicly-
traded biotech companies brought in over 12.4 billion dollars,3 and
117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997).
Brooklyn Law School Class of 1999; B.S. Biology, East Carolina
University, 1987; M.S. Biology, East Carolina University, 1991. The author
would like to thank the editorial staff of the Journal of Law and Policy,
Professor Gary M. Butter of Brooklyn Law School and Baker & Botts, L.L.P.,
and Dr. Rochelle K. Seide of Baker & Botts, L.L.P. for their helpful comments,
suggestions, and discussions. Finally, the author would like to thank Sally
Meiners for her unending support and encouragement.
' Janice M. Mueller, Crafting Patents for the Twenty-First Century:
Maximize Patent Strength and Avoid Prosecution History Estoppel in a Post-
Markman/Hilton Davis World, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 499, 506 (1997).
A particularly important aspect of the "battleground" is that, under Warner-
Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., a jury decides infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents. 117 S. Ct. 1040, 1053 (1997) (approving of the
determination by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC") that the
doctrine of equivalents is a question of fact).
2 This Note will refer to "biotechnology" and "biotech" interchangeably.
' John Hodgson & Riku Ldhteenmidki, Public Biotechnology Companies
Earn $12.4 Billion, Spend $5.2 Billion, 15 NATURE BIOTECH. 412, 412 (1997).
The figures quoted are for publicly-traded biotechnology companies. Id.
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spent 5.2 billion dollars on research.4 Biotech is, however, an
industry in which revenues are "hopelessly skewed,"5 with the five
largest companies6 earning seventy percent of the industry's
revenues.7 Many biotech companies' revenues do not even reach
one million dollars, and for many more, research outlays far exceed
revenues.8 While biotech companies can make money from sources
other than product sales,9 most of the largest biotech companies all
have major products on the market.'" Biotech products, like
4 Id. at 412.
5Id.
6 In order of revenues, the five largest biotech Companies in 1996 were
Amgen ($2.239 billion), Chiron ($1.313 billion), Genentech ($969 million),
Quintiles ($538 million) and Genzyme ($511 million). Id. at 412-13.
7 Id. at 413.
8 See id. at 412-13. For example, Amylin spent $65 million on research and
development while earning $35.8 million; British Biotech spent $47.63 million
and earned $13.83 million; Cephalon spent $62.1 million and earned $21.37
million; and COR Therapeutics spent $50.79 million while earning $18.76
million. Id. Research expenditures can represent relatively large investments for
many companies. See generally id. For example, 128 companies spent in excess
of $10 million on research in 1996. Id. at 413. The excess of research outlays
over revenues is normal for younger companies that have not yet begun to
produce products. However, not all companies that spend heavily on research
suffer paltry revenues. Four of the largest spenders also enjoyed the industry's
highest revenues. Id.
9 Id. at 413. Biotech companies may derive earnings from interest income
from funds generated by public offerings, contract research and royalties. Id.
"0 For example, Amgen is marketing Epogen, a drug which stimulates the
production of red blood cells. See Jennifer Fron Mauer, New Products Expected
to Aid Biotech Products, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 1998, at B12 (noting several
large biotech companies and their current products). Chiron currently sells
Betaseron, a drug for the treatment of multiple sclerosis. Id. Genzyme markets
Sepracoat, an antiscarring product. Id. Agouron Pharmaceuticals sells a protease
inhibitor under the trade name Viracept, a drug for the treatment of AIDS. Id.
Quintiles has taken a somewhat different approach by providing drug develop-
ment, testing, and marketing services to other biotech corporations. See Bernard
Condon, Annual Report on American Industry Where Time is Almost Priceless,
FORBES, Jan. 12, 1998, at 176 (discussing Quintiles' market niche as a service-
provider); David Ranii, Testing the Limits, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Jan. 16, 1997, at C10 (discussing the growth of Quintiles).
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products in other industries, are protected by patents. 1 As a
relatively new technology and industry, however, biotech has had
its share of problems and controversies with the law of patents.12
" Patents not only protect against duplication of an invention by a
competitor, they also protect investment. Mueller, supra note 1, at 506
(discussing "building in equivalency" to patent applications). "[T]he strength of
a patent lies not just in the novelty of the claimed technology, but also in the
marketplace value of the patent as an asset that can provide broad protection for
the client's technology investment for the next 20 years .... ." Mueller, supra
note 1, at 506.
12 For example, the patent code requires an invention to be non-obvious in
light of prior art. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1997). However, it was at one time
unclear whether a known process for producing a particular molecule of
deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") makes the molecule itself obvious. Compare In
re Deuel, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1210, 1215 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that a DNA
molecule produced by a known process was not obvious), with Ex parte
Goldgaber, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1172, 1181 (B.P.A.I. 1996) (holding that a DNA
product produced by a known process was obvious). Now, section 103 of the
Patent Code specifically disallows rejection of a patent because of the method by
which a DNA molecule was produced. 35 U.S.C. § 103(c).
A controversy also exists as to whether unpredictability of some products'
activity may legitimately be used to restrict or deny certain patents. See Sean
Johnston & Leora Ben-Ami, Unpredictability Factor Narrows Biotech Patents:
Courts Have Held Biotechnology Inventions Nonenabled When Results are
Deemed Unreliable, NAT'L L.J., June 16, 1997, at C2 (discussing problems of
enablement in biotech patents due to the perceived "unpredictability" of
biotechnology). Furthermore, what may be obvious or enabling to a scientist is
not necessarily so to a court. See, e.g., In re Deuel, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1215, 1216
(focusing on structure in stating that "a prior art disclosure of the amino acid
sequence of a protein does not necessarily render particular DNA molecules
encoding the protein obvious" and "[b]ecauseDeuel's patent application does not
describe how to obtain any DNA except the disclosed cDNA molecules, [the
claims in dispute] may be considered to be inadequately supported by the
disclosure of the application"); Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharm., 927 F.2d 1200,
1212 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (focusing on function in holding that Amgen had not
sufficiently enabled a generic claim for DNA sequences encoding erythropoietin
analogs, despite the simple convertibility of erythropoietin's protein sequenceinto
a DNA sequence); Kenneth G. Chahine, Going Beyond the Native: Protecting
DNA and Protein Patents, 15 NATuRE BIOTECH. 183, 185 (1997) (discussing the
Amgen v. Chugai and In re Deuel cases).
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Recently, the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v Hilton
Davis Chemical Co. 3 has further muddied the waters by redefin-
ing the doctrine of equivalents, previously expanded by the
CAFC.' 4 Under the doctrine of equivalents, a jury may find that
a product infringes the claims 5 of a patent, not because it dupli-
cates the invention literally, but because it performs the same
function in the same way so as to achieve the same result as the
invention. 6 A broad doctrine of equivalents introduces uncertainty
into the scope of patents because it allows a jury to find infringe-
ment by an accused product that falls outside a patent claim's
literal scope. 7 In an attempt to restrict the application of the
doctrine and inject certainty into the scope of patents, the Supreme
Court eschewed the CAFC's application of the doctrine to the
invention as a whole, holding that the doctrine should instead be
applied to each element of a claim. 8 Despite the Supreme Court's
ruling, the "rigid 'element-by-element' analysis will not increase
the certainty in determining the scope of claims, especially in
13 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997).
14 Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
"5 A patent's claims "precisely define the scope of the exclusive rights the
patent will confer." DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTAND-
ING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 2D[3] (1992) (describing the aspects of
claims).
16 The Supreme Court recited this three part test (the "function-way-result"
test) in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S.
605, 608 (1950). The CAFC, in contrast, has emphasized the substantiality of the
differences between an accused product and an invention. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d
at 1518. Despite this emphasis, however, the CAFC continues to utilize the
function-way-result test. See Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson
Co., 114 F.3d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating that accused process
performed "substantially the same function in substantially the same way to reach
substantially the same result" as the invention).
" The scope of a patent's claims, and therefore the scope of the patent's
protection, is a matter of law to be decided by a judge. Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1394-96 (1996).
i" Hilton Davis, 117 S. Ct. at 1054. Elements are limitations on, or




complex fields such as biotechnology.' 9 Biotechnology, as an
industry relying on difficult-to-produce, technically-complex
products, requires that the scope of patent claims be well-
defined.20 Biotechnology, in fact, would benefit from a restricted
application of the doctrine of equivalents because application of the
doctrine to biotechnology is uncertain and inconsistent, a doctrine
of equivalents that is even moderately broad tends to be anticom-
petitive, and because broad patent claims are already, or should be,
available.
This Note argues that the CAFC and Supreme Court interpreta-
tions of the doctrine of equivalents in their respective Hilton Davis
decisions are inappropriate for biotechnology, and that the doctrine
should be applied at the discretion of the court, not at the whim of
a plaintiff when filing suit. Part I provides an overview of the
biotech industry, including biotech products and their development.
Part II examines the development of the doctrine of equivalents,
with particular focus on the CAFC and Supreme Court Hilton
Davis decisions. Finally, Part III argues that economics and the
nature of the biotech industry require a more narrowly applied
doctrine of equivalents. This Note concludes that the doctrine of
equivalents should be applied to the biotechnology industry as a
doctrine applied by a jury only if a judge rules its use is equitable
under the facts of a particular case.
I. BIOTECHNOLOGY - AN OVERVIEW
Biotechnology is the technology of manipulating, inter alia,
DNA and proteins2' to produce commercially useful, primarily
'9 Howard L. Levine, The Doctrine of Equivalents, 15 NATURE BIOTECH.
383, 384 (1997).
20 See generally Rochelle K. Seide & Melissa Szanto, Drafting Claims for
Biotechnology Inventions, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW INSTITUTE 1995, at
357 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course
Handbook Series No. 426, 1995) (discussing the specifics of drafting claims for
biotech products).
21 DNA is the molecule which contains all the information a cell needs to
perform all of its essential processes. See BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 95-101 (1989) (providing a general overview of DNA).
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medical and agricultural, products. Biotechnology, particularly in
the field of drug development, is a booming industry.22 In the
words of James A. Geraghty, CEO of Genzyme Transgenic
Corporation, "Biotechnology seeks to address human suffering. This
technology provides the ability to provide a wide range of
therapeutics many of which offer the potential to successfully treat
serious diseases not treatable any other way."'23 Biotechnology's
patentable products now include naturally-occurring and engineered
DNA is a long, strand-like molecule comprising four different components called
nucleotides: adenosine (A); cytosine (C); guanine (G); and thymine (T). See id.
at 99. DNA is most often represented as a series of these four letters, for
example, AATGCAATGT. See id. at 97. Some portions of a strand of DNA
produce, or code for, specific proteins. See id. at 101-02. For example, when a
DNA strand encoding a human protein is placed within a plasmid (a small loop
of DNA which is copied when a bacterial cell divides, see, e.g., id. at 259) the
resulting molecule is called recombinant DNA. Id. Recombinant DNA can be
used to produce commercially-useful protein products.
Proteins are composed of one or more strands of molecules called amino
acids. See id. at 55, 107-08. The sequence of a DNA molecule determines the
amino acid sequence of a protein. The DNA is "read" by a cell as a series of
triplets of nucleotides (codons); most codons represent a particular amino acid.
See id. at 102-03. The cell, therefore, translates DNA into a string of amino acids
which constitutes a protein. See id. at 104. There are 61 codons which represent
20 amino acids; most amino acids, therefore, are represented by more than one
codon. See id. at 101-15.
An important concept in understanding the relationship between a protein
and the DNA sequence that encodes it is that many changes in the DNA
sequence, known as silent mutations, make absolutely no difference in the
sequence of the protein. See id. at 100. The remainder of DNA sequence
changes, however, do affect the protein's sequence; of these substitutions, some
will have little or no effect on a protein's functionality, while others will have
a major effect, sometimes destroying the protein's functionality altogether. Thus,
a researcher may possess a DNA sequence which encodes a protein having a
different amino acid sequence as a patented protein, but having a function
substantially the same as the patented protein.
22 See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (describing the recent growth
of the drug industry through biotechnology).
23 James A. Geraghty, Cloning - Challenges for Public Policy, CONGRES-
SIONAL TESTIMONY BY FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE, Mar. 12, 1997,
available in 1996 WL 8219966.
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DNA molecules 24 and proteins, 25 antibodies,26 genetically engi-
neered single-cell organisms, 27 plants,28 animals29 and the tools
of biotechnological research.3"
24 See Recent Patent Applications in the Area of Genomics, 15 NATURE
BIOTECH. 385,385 (1997) (listing patent applications involving DNA sequences).
25 See infra notes 32-47 and accompanying text (giving examples of protein
products with medical applications); Recent Patent Applications in the Area of
Peptides, 15 NATURE BIOTECH. 186, 186 (1997) (listing patent applications
involving protein sequences); Some Patent Applications in Vectors and
Expression Systems, 15 NATURE BIOTECH. 1727, 1727 (1997) (listing patent
applications for inventions relating to mass production of proteins).
26 See Patent Applications in the Area of Monoclonal Antibodies, 15
NATURE BIOTECH. 588, 588 (1997) (listing patent applications involving the use
of monoclonal antibodies in, inter alia, the diagnosis and treatment of cancer).
27 See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). Chakrabarty filed
a patent application for a bacterium which contained a plasmid enabling it to
break down oil. Id. at 303. The Supreme Court held that the bacterium itself was
patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as a manufacture or composition of matter. Id.
at 309. See also Patent Applications in the Area of Expression Systems, 15
NATURE BIOTECH. 1027, 1027 (1997) (listing recentpatent applications involving
the production of various biomolecules using microorganisms); Patent
Applications in the Area of Fermentation, 15 NATURE BIOTECH. 913, 913 (1997)
(listing patent applications involving the use of microorganisms in fermentation).
28 See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (describing agricultural
products).
29 The most famous example of a genetically engineered animal is the
oncomouse, United States patent No. 4,736,866, a mouse genetically engineered
to be susceptible to cancer. The mouse contains a recombinant activated
oncogene, a gene which, by definition, will cause cancer, See CHISUM & JACOBS,
supra note 15, at § 2C[1][e].
30 See Recent Patent Applications in the Area of Chromatography, 15
NATURE BIOTECH. 802 (1997) (listing patent applications involving methods of
separating proteins); Recent Patent Applications in the Area of Electrophoresis,
15 NATURE BIOTECH. 1308, 1308 (1997) (listing patent applications involving
electrophoresis (the separation of DNA molecules or proteins in an electric
field)); Recent Patent Applications in the Area of Sequencing, 15 NATURE
BIOTECH. 474, 474 (1997) (listing patents involving methods and machinery for
DNA sequencing).
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A. Technology and Products
Biotechnology's hottest research area is searching through the
human genome to find targets for new drugs a.3 These medical
products are generally naturally-occurring proteins or nucleotide
sequences,32 useful. in themselves or as research tools for the
development of drugs. 33 For example, the Regents of the Univer-
sity of California hold a patent for the transfer of genes for human
insulin and proinsulin34 into microorganisms in order to facilitate
mass production of the two proteins.35 Genentech, one of the
largest biotech companies, used recombinant DNA36 technology
to produce tissue plasminogen activator, a protein that dissolves
blood clots within the body.37 Amgen currently markets Epogen®
and Neupogen ®, which boost red blood cell and white blood cell
counts, respectively.
38
3' See Elyse Tanouye et al., Genetic Giant: Glaxo and SmithKline give Stock
Markets Shock Treatment, WALL ST. J. (Europe), Feb. 3, 1998; at 1 (discussing
the "explosion in scientific breakthroughs" brought about by the hunt for human
genes which would lead to biological targets for drug action).
32 See supra notes 21-21 for a discussion of DNA and protein.
33 See Tanouye, supra note 31, at 1.
3" These proteins are important for treating diabetes. See ALBERTS, supra
note 21, at 122.
35 Jeffrey L. Fox, Insulin Patent Dispute Revisits Old Biotechnology
Battleground, 15 NATURE BIOTECH. 307, 307 (1997) (describing the patent held
by the Regents of the University of California).
36 See supra note 21 (defining recombinant DNA).
37 See Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found., 29 F.3d 1555, 1557-58 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (describing tissue plasminogen activator and its effect on blood clots).
A similar product, an anticlotting agent manufactured by Centocor under the
trade name ReoPro, enjoys steady sales, and is expected to generate $64 million
during the third quarter of 1997 for Centocor's marketing partner, Eli Lilly. See
Michael Rapoport, Strong Third Quarter Seen for Agouron, Other Biotech Firms,
SAN DIEGO DAILY TRANSCRIPT, Oct. 7, 1997, at IA.
" Rapoport, supra note 37, at IA (describing the maturing market for
Epogen® and Neupogen"). Sales of the two drugs slowed in 1996, causing
earnings to drop. Rapoport, supra note 37, at IA. Notwithstanding this drop,
Amgen still expects a double-digit increase in earnings in 1997. Rapoport, supra
note 37, at IA.
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A variety of medical products are currently under development
and awaiting approval by the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA").39 NPS Pharmaceuticals of Salt Lake City is currently
developing methods of treating hyperparathyroidism, ° osteo-
porosis41 and central nervous disorders.42 Aquila BioPharmaceuti-
cals, a relatively new company, is working on drugs to treat feline
leukemia, pneumonia, malaria and tick-borne diseases.43 Immunex
Corporation is close to marketing Enbrel®, a drug treatment for
rheumatoid arthritis." Lastly, Centocor is close to FDA approval
for a drug to treat Crohn's disease, an inflammatory bowel
disorder.45
Biotechnology is also making great strides in agriculture. Early
agricultural applications involved the development of pest- or
disease-resistant crops. 46 Disease-resistant animals are also desir-
able; to this end, Aquila BioPharmaceuticals is currently developing
9 See infra note 52 (describing the FDA approval process).
40 Hyperparathyroidism is a malfunction of the thyroid gland which results
in an excess of calcium in the blood, which in turn can result in kidney failure.
See Laura B. Benko, Utah Cash and Promising Pill Beat Biotech Blues,
INVESTOR'S BusINESS DAILY, June 26, 1997, at A4 (describing Norcalcin, which
treats primary hyperparathyroidism, as one of NPS' successes in 1996). The
potential worldwide market for Norcalcin is $1 billion a year. Id.
41 Id. Osteoporosis is a gradual decalcification of bones during aging,
resulting in weakened and brittle bones. D. L. Glaser & F.S. Kaplan, Osteo-
porosis: Definition and Clinical Presentation, 22 SPINE 12S (1997) (describing
the symptomology of osteoporosis).
42 id.
41 See CEO Interview: Dr. Alison Taunton-Rigby President and CEO,
Discusses the Outlook for Aguila BioPharmaceuticals, WALL ST. TRANSCRIPT
DIGEST, May 5, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8108476 (recounting Dr. Taunton-
Rigby's views on Aquila's product development) [hereinafter CEO Interview].
4See Jonathan D. Miller, Immunex Discovery Shows Promise for Arthritis
Relief, VALLEY DAILY NEWS (Kent, Wash.), July 21, 1997, at C2 (outlining the
development of Enbrel®). If approved, Enbrel® could generate in excess of $100
million for Immunex in its first year. Id.
41 See Rapoport, supra note 37, at IA (describing expectations of FDA
approval of cA2, a drug to treat Crohn's disease). cA2 is the first real possibility
of a treatment for the disease, and could generate a billion dollars for Centocor.
See Rapoport, supra note 37, at IA.
46 See Bill Mintz, Making Hay with Corn: Texas Firm Leads Way to Edible
Vaccines, Hous. CHRON., June 18, 1997, at 1.
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a drug to prevent bovine mastitis, a disease that poses problems in
the dairy industry.47 Also, another company, ProdiGene of College
Station, Texas, is engineering corn to produce industrial quantities
of proteins, as well as to produce animal and human vaccines.
B. Development Costs and Problems
The process of bringing a drug to market is lengthy and
expensive, and involves several years of testing. For example, the
cost to Immunex Corporation to bring a biotechnology product to
market is $350 million to $400 million." Contributing to the
expense is mandatory compliance with FDA drug testing regula-
tions.5" Companies developing drugs must closely follow three
clinical trial phases mandated by the FDA; these trials together can
last more than three years.52 Moreover, the FDA/s pre-approval
47 See CEO Interview, supra note 43.
48 See Mintz, supra note 46, at 1 (describing Prodigene's success at mass-
producing proteins by genetically modifying corn).
49 See Mintz, supra note 46, at 1 (describing the potential for the production
of edible vaccines). Agricultural vaccines are delivered to livestock orally. Mintz,
supra note 46, at 1. The same concept can work in humans if a plant such as
corn is genetically engineered to express proteins that resemble proteins found
in disease organisms; consumers would vaccinate themselves simply by eating
the corn. Mintz, supra note 46, at 1. ProdiGene expects to begin animal testing
within two years, with human vaccines to follow in approximately eight years.
Mintz, supra note 46, at 1.
'o Miller, supra note 44, at C2.
51 See generally Reinventing and Harmonizing Biotech Regulation: FDA
Regulatory Procedures Need Changes to Keep Pace with the Development in the
Biotechnology Industry, BIOPHARM, Sept. 1, 1997, at 16 (outlining various
measures for increasing the efficiency of the FDA's regulatory procedures as
applied to biotechnology).
52 See Elizabeth M. Rutherford, The FDA and "Privatization - The Drug
Approval Process, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 203, 212-13 (1995). The FDA
mandates a rigorous set of trials for safety reasons. Id. at 212. A drug must first
prove itself in nonhuman systems such as cell cultures and in animal models,
(typically mice, rats or rabbits). Id. This process may take three and a half years.
Id. The FDA then mandates human trials in three phases. Phase I trials, involving
20 to 80 patients, primarily evaluate the drug's safety over the course of a year.
Id. at 213. Phase II trials, lasting approximately two years and involving 100-300
patients, evaluate dosing, drug efficacy and side effects. Id. If Phase II trials
750
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review process often takes longer than statutorily mandated, further
delaying a drug's introduction to the market.
53
Post-approval regulation, however, has become somewhat less
burdensome. To handle an increase in the number of biotech
products, the FDA created the Center for Biologics Evaluation and
Research ("CBER") in 1987. 54 After encountering problems
related to the use of outdated review procedures," CBER insti-
tuted changes that have somewhat eased the regulatory burden
imposed upon biotech companies.1
6
Another aspect of biotechnology that increases the speculative
nature of biotech products is the possible hesitancy of foreign
markets to accept products, particularly genetically-manipulated
organisms. For example, Ciba-Geigy encountered resistance from
the United Kingdom over Ciba's genetically-engineered com."
7
show the drug has the desired effect, Phase III trials, involving several thousand
patients, are conducted to confmn data regarding safety and efficacy. Id.
" See id. (noting that the FDA, while statutorily obligated to review drug
applications within six months, frequently takes as long as thirty months).
See id.
" For example, CBER initially used a lot-by-lot analysis of products, which
was well suited to the vaccines and blood products with which biotech products
had been grouped, but not to the biotech products themselves, which should more
appropriately have been treated like conventional drugs. See id.
56 In 1992, the new CBER director reorganized the Center into three units,
one specifically for biotech products. See id. The resulting differential review
procedures better reflected the needs of the biotech industry. See id. Further, in
1995, the regulations of biotech and conventional drugs were harmonized. See
id. The purpose of this and other regulatory changes is to reduce time spent in
post-approval regulation so as to free time for processing of product registration
applications. See id.
" John Hodgson, UK's Ciba Maize Decision "Political"?, 15 NATURE
BIOTECH. 308, 308 (1997). The United Kingdom's objections were supposed by
some to be political in nature, but they actually had a sound scientific basis. Id.
Ciba's corn contained new genes which conferred insect resistance. Id. The corn
also contained a gene for resistance to ampicillin, a common antibiotic, a gene
left over from the process of inserting the insect resistance genes into the corn.
Id. Some feared that, if the ampicillin-resistance gene were ever transferred from
the corn to bacteria, it could be reproduced, making the bacteria resistant to
ampicillin and therefore more difficult to kill. Id. Ciba's corn is not the only
controversial product: "Every single one of the plant biotechnology products that
is in the pipeline will provoke further controversy about safety. . . ." Id. at 310
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However, while such markets can be somewhat speculative at
times, they are profitable.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
A. Purpose of the Doctrine
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective ... Discoveries.""8 Congress implemented this power
by establishing a national patent systemi 9 A patent grants the
inventor the right to exclude others from making, selling or
using6' his or her invention for fourteen 61 or twenty years.62
(quoting John Beringer of the Advisory Committee on Releases into the
Environment, a committee advising the Department of Energy).
-" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
'9 See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 15, at § 2B[1] (describing the early
history of U.S. patents).
60 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1997). Section 154(a)(1) of the Patent Code states
"[e]very patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the
patentee... of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale,
or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention
into the United States." Id. Currently, there are three types of patents: utility
patents, which cover "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof," 35 U.S.C.
§ 101; design patents, which cover the designs of useful inventions, 35 U.S.C.
§ 171; and plant patents, which cover any asexually-reproduced "new variety
of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings,
other than a tuberpropagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state," 35
U.S.C. § 161. Biotechnologicalproducts are classified as compositions of matter,
and therefore are covered by utility patents. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(b)(1) (referring
to the product of a biotechnological process as a composition of matter);
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (holding geneticallymodified
bacteria patentable as, inter alia, a composition of matter).
61 35 U.S.C. § 173 (applying to design patents only).
62 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). The twenty-year patent term is for patents issued
after June 8, 1995, and the time is measured from the date of filing. See Gerald
Sobel, Developments in Patent Law at the Federal Circuit, 477 PRACTICING L.
INST.1071 (1997). For patents in force on June 8, 1995, the patent term is either
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Patents are obtained by application to the Patent and Trademark
Office.63 The heart of a patent is the set of claims which define
the invention, and the elements which make up those claims."
the original 17-year term (which began upon issuance of the patent) or the new
20-year term, whichever is longer. Id.
63 Obtaining a patent involves a process called prosecution. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 131 (1997) (requiring examination of patent applications); CHISUM & JACOBS,
supra note 15, at § 2D[1] (describing the examination process). During
prosecution, an application claiming an invention is examined by an examiner at
the Patent and Trademark Office. CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 15, at § 2D[1I].
The examiner reviews the prior art, and indicates whether each claim is allowed
or rejected. CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 15, at § 2D[1]. To allow the claim,
the examiner must determine that the invention is patentable subject matter, 35
U.S.C. § 101, novel, 35 U.S.C. § 102, useful, 35 U.S.C. § 101, nonobvious, 35
U.S.C. § 103, andnot statutorily barred, 35 U.S.C. § 102. See generally Christine
E. Carty, Biotechnology Patent Applications, C909 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 195 (1994)
(describing claim requirements for biotechnologicalinventions). Biotechnological
inventions must meet the same patentability requirements as other inventions. Id.
Potentially patentablebiotechnologicalprocesses have receivedspecialnotice
in the Patent Code. A "biotechnological process" is defined as
(A) a process of genetically altering or otherwise inducing a single- or
multi-celled organism to (i) express an exogenous nucleotide sequence
[one placed within the cell by artificial means]; (ii) inhibit, eliminate,
augment, or alter expression of an endogenous nucleotide sequence
[meaning, a process altering natural gene expression]; or (iii) express
a specific physiological characteristic not naturally associated with said
organism; (B) cell fusion procedures... ; and (C) methods of using
products defined by [the process].
35 U.S.C. § 103(b)(3).
' See Paula N. Chavez, How to Read a Patent Claim, 475 PRACTICING L.
INST. 345, 348 (1997) (explaining the analysis of claim elements). See also Mark
A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEx. L. REv. 989, 1000-04 (1997) (discussing the scope of patent claims,
including the expansion of claims by generic claims, the doctrine of equivalents
and inclusion of unanticipated claims, and the limitations of claims by the
requirements of novelty and enablement). The claims are part of the specifica-
tion, which is contained in the patent document.
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
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If a product or process reads on all the elements of a claim of a
patented product or process, the accused product or process
infringes the patent.6' Any aspect of the invention not claimed in
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated
by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (setting forth the enablement and best mode requirements for
patent claims). While the specification is important to an understanding of the
claims, particularly highly technical claims, litigation is based largely on the
language of the claims themselves. Chavez, supra, at 347.
6' See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Section 271(a) states that "whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the
term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent." A patent may be infringed
literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note
15, at §§ 2F[2][a], [b]; Chavez, supra note 64, at 348.
Determination of infringement is a two-step process. See Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1388 (1996) ("Victory in a patent
suit requires a finding that a patent claim 'covers the alleged infringer's product
or process,' which in turn necessitates a determination of what the words in the
claim mean."). First, a judge determines the meaning and scope of the claims.
Id. at 1387 ("[T]he construction of a patent, including terms of art within its
claim, is exclusively within the province of the court."). Second, the factflmder
determines if the accusedproduct infringes the patent by determining whether the
accused product reads on each element of the claim, either literally or substan-
tially under the doctrine of equivalents. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde
Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-08 (1950) (describing literal and equivalent
infringement); Chavez, supra note 64, at 348. If the accused product has all of
the elements of one claim protecting the invention, the accused product literally
infringes the invention's patent. CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 15, at § 2F[2][a];
Chavez, supra note 64, at 348. The test for infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents, is whether "there is 'equivalence' between the elements of the
accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention."
Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040, 1045
(1997). Equivalence is not explicitly defined in the Patent Code. See generally
35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
Infringement is a mixed question of law and fact. The Supreme Court's
decision in Markman established that a judge should decide the scope and
interpretation of claims as a matter of law. 116 S. Ct. at 1387. The same Court
in Hilton Davis did not decide whether a judge or jury should determine
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents; it did, however, uphold the
Federal Circuit's decision that the jury was the proper factfimder. 117 S. Ct. at
1053.
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the specification is, theoretically, not protectable.66 Such a strict
and literal reading of a patent, however, harms a patentee because
it allows another inventor to make insubstantial modifications
which take the modified invention outside of the protection
afforded by the patent.67 Some protection, therefore, is needed
against new inventions which do not infringe literally, yet do not
embody substantial changes.68
The doctrine of equivalents provides such protection.69 Since
the early nineteenth century, courts have allowed patentees to
defend patents against "inventors" who have made insubstantial
changes to the patentee's claimed invention in an attempt to get
around the plain language of the patent.70 Such equivalent inven-
tions lack the substantial changes required for an invention to be
patentable. 71 Thus, even where no literal infringement can be
found, the doctrine of equivalents allows a finding of infringement
66 The claims in a patent define the invention. See Chavez, supra note 64,
at 347. Patentees are estopped from asserting infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents through a claim construction relinquished during the course of
prosecution; this is known as prosecution history estoppel. Chavez, supra note
64, at 349. At times prosecution history estoppel is applied very stringently. For
example, in Tanabe Seiyaku Co. v. United States International Trade Commis-
sion, Tanabe appealed an International Trade Commission ruling that other
companies' processes of producing an imported pharmaceutical did not infringe
Tanabe's patented process, which involved an acetone-containing solvent. 109
F.3d 726, 727 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The accused process used butanone, which is
chemically very similar to acetone. Id. at 729. Tanabe argued the two were
equivalent, but the court held that Tanabe's exclusion of butanone from the
patent showed that the two solvents were not equivalent. Id. at 732. Because
Tanabe had given up butanone as an element during patent prosecution, it was
estopped from claiming infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Id.
67 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607
(1950).
68 See id. at 607-08. "Outright and forthright duplication is a dull and very
rare type of infringement. To prohibit no other would place the inventor at the
mercy of verbalism and would be subordinating substance to form." Id. at 607.
69 See id. at 608-09.
70 See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text (discussing three nineteenth-
century cases explaining the requirement for substantial differences in a product
from an existing invention).
7 Practically, a product and the invention from which it differs unsubstan-
tially are the same. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608.
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by a determination that one invention is the substantial equivalent
of a patented invention. 2
B. History and Development of the Doctrine of Equivalents
The idea is not new that substantial changes must be made to
existing technology before a new invention is patentable. As early
as 1814, Justice Story asserted that "[m]ere colorable differences,
or slight improvements, cannot shake the right of the inventor.
7 3
In 1817, Justice Washington stated that "[w]here the machines are
substantially the same, and operate in the same manner, to produce
the same kind of result, they must be in principle the same. '74 In
1853, in Winans v Denmead, the Supreme Court noted that, while
a case of literal infringement is easy to decide, "[iut is only
ingenious diversities of form and proportion, presenting the
appearance of something unlike the thing patented, which give rise
72 Judge Nies of the CAFC stated that "[t]he doctrine is comparable to the
concept of determining the fair use of a copyrighted work." Hilton Davis
Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1561-62 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
73 Odiome v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814)(No.
10,432). Justice Story's charge to the jury focused on effect: "The material
question, therefore, is not whether the same elements of motion, or the same
component parts are used, but whether the given effect is produced substantially
by the same mode of operation, and in the same combination of powers, in both
machines." Id.
7" Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1015, 1017 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817)(No. 5718). The
court in Gray further stated that "[i]f then the jury should be of opinion, that the
two machines are the same in principle, it is no defence for the defendants...
that they have improved [the machine], no matter to what extent." Id. at 1017.
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to questions. ' 75 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions reiterated the
doctrine.76
The modem contours of the doctrine of equivalents were
outlined by the Supreme Court in Graver Tank & Manufacturing
Co. v. Linde Air Products Co. 77 The Graver Tank Court outlined
a three-part test of equivalency requiring the allegedly infringing
product perform the same function, in the same way, to produce the
same result as the patented invention. 78 This test is referred to as
7' 56 U.S. 330, 342 (1853). Winans addressed the infringement of a patent
for the design of a railroad coal car able to carry more than its own weight. Id.
at 332. While the special shape of the hoppers on the plaintiff's car, which
resulted in its extra capacity, was cylindrical and conical, defendant's was
octagonal and conical. Id. at 333. The jury was instructed to determine if the
defendant had "constructed cars which, substantially, on the same principle and
on the same mode of operation, accomplished the same result." Id. at 334. The
Court found equivalency through the implied breadth of the plaintiff's claim. Id.
at 342. The Court stated that "[w]hen a patentee describes a machine ... he is
understood to intend to claim and does by law actually cover, not only the
precise forms he has claimed, but all other forms which embody his invention."
Id. Thus, "where form and substance are inseparable, it is enough to look at the
form only." Id. at 343. However, the Court held that form and substance were
separable; different forms embodying the same substance, therefore, could
infringe, even if not literally.
76 See Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929) (stating
that an accused product infringes if "there is no substantial departure from the
description of the patent, but a mere colorable difference therefrom"); Imhaeuser
v. Buerk, 101 U.S. 647, 656 (1879) (finding that a new combination of old
ingredients patentable, but mere substitution of an old ingredient with another
ingredient that performs the same function infringes the patent on the combina-
tion); Union Paper-Bag Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877)
(holding that two devices are the same if they perform the same work in
substantially the same way and accomplish substantially the same result).
77 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950). The invention in question, patented by Linde
Air Products Co., was a welding flux containing silicates of calcium and
magnesium. Id. at 610. Graver Tank's compound contained silicates of calcium
and manganese. Id. Linde Air Products' flux contained "a major proportion of
alkaline earth metal." Id. at 613. While magnesium is an alkaline earth metal,
manganese is not. Id. at 610. Graver Tank's welding flux, therefore, fell outside
the literal bounds of Linde Air Products' patent. Id. at 612. The Court, however,
affirmed the trial judge's holding that the two fluxes were functionally
equivalent. Id. at 611-12.
71 Id. at 608.
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the "function-way-result" test.79 The Court admitted, however, that
the test had been developed in an era of relatively simple tech-
nology.8" Furthermore, the application of the test as outlined was
necessarily contextual.8 The Court stated that
[w]hat constitutes equivalency must be determined against
the context of the patent, the prior art, and the particular
circumstances of the case. Equivalence, in the patent law,
is not the prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to
be considered in a vacuum.. . . In determining equivalents,
things equal to the same thing may not be equal to each
other and, by the same token, things for most purposes
different may sometimes be equivalents.82
Though the doctrine may be considered fair to the patentee, it is
apparent that its application sacrifices the certainty and predict-
ability of patents.8 3
One commentator has ascribed to Graver Tank the fundamental
split between literal and equivalent infringement." "If accused
matter falls clearly within the claim, infringement is made out and
that is the end of it .... [A] patentee may[, however,] invoke [the
doctrine of equivalents if] a device '... . performs substantially the
same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same
result."' 85 Prior to Graver Tank, the Court had viewed equivalents
79 See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d
1512, 1518 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
80 See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Justices Black and Douglas, dissenting in Graver Tank, voiced the fear
that the doctrine of equivalents introduced undue uncertainty into patents. Id. at
617. The two Justices also decried what they perceived to be a new requirement
of prescience by businesses. Id. A manufacturer could no longer "rely on what
the language of a patent claims. He must be able, at the peril of heavy
infringement damages, to forecast how far a court relatively unversed in a
particular technological field will expand the claim's language ..... Id.
84 See Robert M. Meeks, Metaphors of Infringement and Equivalence: The
Solution of Our Problems, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 279, 291 (1994) (noting that
this case was the first to differentiate literal from equivalent infringement).
85 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607-08 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v.
Winters, 280 U.S. 30 (1929)). However, Justice Jackson's comment "that is the
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as being part of the claims themselves.86 Specifications were read
broadly so as to protect an inventor's interest in protecting his
entire invention, and to fulfill the Constitutional mandate of
promoting the useful arts.87 The dichotomy between literal and
equivalent infringement was subsequently "institutionalized" by the
creation of the CAFC,88 which has held that "the scope of patent
protection as defined by the claims[] remain[s] the same and
application of the doctrine expands the right to exclude to 'equival-
ents' of what is claimed.,
89
After Graver Tank, the CAFC refined the doctrine of equiva-
lents by applying it to each element of a claim, holding that "each
element of a claim is material and essential, and that in order for
a court to find infringement, the plaintiff must show the presence
of every element or its substantial equivalent in the accused
device." 90 This approach purported to offer more certainty than
end of it" was not entirely correct; he subsequently asserted that an accused
device reading literally on a patent's claims may not infringe where it "is so far
changed in principle .. . that it performs the same or similar function in a
substantially different way." Id. at 608. This is referred to as the reverse doctrine
of equivalents.
86 See Meeks, supra note 84, at 287.
87 Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 341 (1853).
88 See Meeks, supra note 84, at 293 (reporting the results of searches on
Westlaw and LEXIS revealing many references to "literal infringement" after
creation of the CAFC, but few before).
89 Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677,
684 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
90 Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988) (describing the element-by-element
analysis). The court further noted that "[tlo be a 'substantial equivalent', the
element substituted in the accused device for the element set forth in the claim
must not be such as would substantially change the way in which the function
of the claimed invention is performed." Id. Subsequent panels of the CAFC
utilized and further refined the element-by-element analysis rule. See Coming
Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1259 (Fed. Cir.
1989) ("'Element' may be used to mean a single limitation [of a claim], but it
has also been used to mean a series of limitations. In the All Elements rule,
'element' is used in the sense of a limitation of a claim."). Subsequent panels of
the CAFC reiterated the all limitations rule that for infringement, each limitation
of a claim had to be met literally or substantially. See Intellicall, Inc. v.
Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Becton Dickinson &
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the equity analysis, yet other decisions viewed an equitable
approach as an exception, not as the rule.9'
One panel of the CAFC developed an analytical method for
determining the extent to which the scope of equivalents was
limited by prior art, material a patentee may not claim in obtaining
his patent.92 In Wilson Sporting Goods v David Geoffrey &
Associates, the CAFC noted that "it may be helpful to conceptual-
ize the limitation ... by visualizing a hypothetical patent claim,
sufficient in scope to literally cover the accused product." 93 If the
hypothetical claim encompassed both the accused product and prior
art, then it would be improper to allow the patentee protection for
an equivalent which would have been denied by the Patent and
Trademark Office over the prior art.9 The CAFC argued the
approach was advantageous because of a closer adherence to
traditional rules of patentability and, ostensibly, a more precise
analysis than a determination of the accused product's obviousness
in light of prior art." The application of this test was, however,
limited in subsequent decisions.96
Co. v. C. R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 796 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Messerschmidt v.
United States., 29 Fed. Cl. 1, 61 (1993) (applying the function-way-result test to
all elements of the disputed claims, after considering precedent arguing for an
equitable application).
91 See Charles Greiner& Co. v. Mari-MedMfg., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (noting retention of equitable aspect of the doctrine of equivalents);
London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(noting that if the doctrine of equivalents were used as the rule, "claims [would]
cease to serve their purpose").




9' Id. at 684-85.
96 See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Mova Pharm. Corp., 951 F. Supp. 333, 337 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (noting that the hypothetical claim test is "preferred, although not
mandatory"); Conroy v. Reebok Int'l, Ltd., 14 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(noting that "[w]hile the hypothetical claim analysis is a useful methodology...
nothing in Wilson mandates its use as the only means for determining the extent
to which prior art restricts the scope of equivalency. . ").
760
EQUITABLE EQUIVALENTS
C. The CAFC Expands the Doctrine of Equivalents
The CAFC eschewed both the element-by-element approach and
the hypothetical claim test in choosing a broad application of the
doctrine in its controversial decision in Hilton Davis Chemical Co.
v Warner-Jenkinson Co.9 7 The CAFC held that, based on Graver
Tank, the test for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
was the "substantiality of the differences between the claimed and
accused products or processes., 98 The CAFC further held that any
plaintiff may assert infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents,99 and that equivalence was a question of fact for the jury to
decide. 00 Tellingly, the CAFC stated that "[t]he trial judge does
not have [equitable] discretion to choose whether to apply the
doctrine of equivalents when the record shows no literal infringe-
ment."' ' Judge Plager, in a dissent joined by Judges Archer,
Rich and Lourie, however, argued strongly for an equitable
application of the doctrine wherein the trial judge would have
discretion in its application."0 2
9' 62 F.3d 1512, 1521-22 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
98 Id. at 1517. While holding that the determinative factor was the
substantiality of differences between accused and patented products or processes,
the CAFC still clung to the finction-way-result test as a means of assessing that
substantiality. Id. at 1518. The court noted that evidence of the interchangeability
of patented and accused products and processes was also relevant to an infringe-
ment analysis. Id.
99 See id. at 1521-22 (noting that the manner in which evidence arises
regarding the substantiality of differences between an invention and an accused
product depends upon how the parties frame their arguments, and that a court
must admit the evidence if it is relevant to a determination of infringement, and
noting one Supreme Court case, in which the Court stated that the doctrine was
available to all patentees, as "inimical to the hypothesis that the doctrine is
equitable").
'oo Id. at 1521 ("[I]nfringement under the doctrine of equivalents is an issue
of fact to be submitted to the jury in a jury trial with proper instructions, and to
be decided by the judge in a bench trial.").
'0o' Id. at 1522. This holding, according to the CAFC, flowed logically from
the finding that equivalence was a legal basis for recovery, not an equitable one,
and that equivalence was a question of fact. Id. at 1521-22.
102 Id. at 1536-45.
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Hilton Davis involved a process patent which covered a method
for the purification of dyes.' °3 Both Hilton Davis and Warner-
Jenkinson produced dyes. " Hilton Davis obtained a patent for
the ultrafiltration method of purification, which was much more
efficient than the old "salting-out" method.' 05 During the prosecu-
tion of the patent, Hilton Davis added the element "at a pH of
approximately 6.0 to 9.0" to the claimed process. 10 6 Warner-
Jenkinson developed and used a similar ultrafiltration process,
operating at a pH of 5.107 As a result, Hilton Davis sued for
infringement and prevailed at the trial level under the doctrine of
equivalents. 108  Notably, the trial judge refused Warner-
Jenkinson's efforts to establish equivalency as an equitable
doctrine.' 09
On appeal, the CAFC reviewed the factual basis for the finding
of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, specifically, the
difference in pH between Hilton Davis' and Warner-Jenkinson's
processes."0 Hilton Davis argued that there was an infringement
because its patent claimed a lower pH limit of "approximately 6.0,"
103 Id. at 1515.
104 Id.
105 Id.
06 Id. pH refers to the acidity or alkalinity of a solution. Low pH indicates
an acidic solution and high pH indicates a basic solution. This modification was
added to differentiate the Hilton Davis patent from one issued to another patentee
whose process operated at pH 11-13. Id. at 1515-16.
07 Id. at 1516. The disputed claims in Wamer-Jenkinson's patent and in
Hilton Davis' patent contained most of the same elements, including equivalent
pressures, pore sizes for the filtering membrane and sequence of filtration steps.
Id. at 1515-16.
108 Id. at 1516. The court also issued a permanent injunction against Wamer-
Jenkinson, preventing it from practicing ultrafiltration "except at pressures above
500 p.s.i.g. and pHs above 9.01." Id. Warner-Jenkinson had begun using its
filtration method without knowledge of Hilton Davis' patent. Id. Though intent
plays no role in finding infringement, id. at 1520, the district court awarded
Hilton Davis only 20% of the award it sought because Wamer-Jenkinson had not
willfully infringed. Id. at 1516.
109 Id. at 1523.
11o Id. at 1524.
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and Warner-Jenkinson's process operated at a pH of 5.0.' The
court decided that the jury appropriately found that pH 5.0 was
equivalent to "approximately 6.0.112
The CAFC then took the "opportunity to restate - not to revise
- the test for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents."
' 3
The CAFC, relying particularly on the Supreme Court's Graver
Tank decision," 4 reiterated the simple assertion in Graver Tank
that "[a] finding of equivalence is a determination of fact.""' 5
However, in citing the Graver Tank Court, the CAFC ignored the
fact that Graver Tank did not hold that a jury must be the finder of
fact." 6 In fact, Graver Tank was originally a bench trial, and
therefore the trial judge was the factfinder 17
i.. Id. (recounting the testimony of Dr. Cook, the inventor for Hilton Davis
Chemical Co., that pH 5 would have the same effect as pH 6 in the process).
2 Id. The court emphasized that the difference in pH wouldhave no effect
on the function of the membrane in filtering the dye. Id. This determination of
equivalence, however, has problems. pH represents the concentration of
hydrogen, or H+, ions in solution. See IRWIN H. SEGEL, BIOCHEMICAL
CALCULATIONS 14-15 (1989). Each numerical decrease in pH represents a tenfold
increase in H+ concentration; therefore, a solution of pH 5 has a tenfold higher
concentration of H+ ions than a solution of pH 6. Id. In determining infringe-
ment, equivalence is a measurement of the substantiality of functional differences
between the invention and the accused product. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at
1518. Nevertheless, it is somewhat disturbing that two processes which possess
an element differing in some aspect by an order of magnitude can be deemed
equivalent. Judge Lourie of the CAFC expressed this view in Genentech Inc. v.
Wellcome Foundation Ltd., arguing that a court could not reasonably hold that
a protein containing 446 amino acids infringes a claim to a protein with 527
amino acids. See 29 F.3d 1555, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Lourie, J., concurring).
.1 Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1516.
14 Id. at 1517-19.
"' Id. at 1520 (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co.,
339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950)).
126 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609-10.
17 Id. at 611. See also Jeff Kuehnle, Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-
Jenkinson Co.: Opening the Floodgates on Nonliteral Patent Infringement
Through the Doctrine of Equivalents, 48 BAYLOR L. REv. 589, 597 (1996). The
CAFC allowed that a judge in a bench trial could determine equivalency. See
Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521. However, the CAFC maintained that ifa jury trial
was properly requested the case had to go to a jury. Id. at 1525.
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The CAFC also rejected the concept of an equitable application
of the doctrine of equivalents."18 The CAFC acknowledged that
the Graver Tank Court had addressed fairness when it explained
that the doctrine protected the patentee against unfair deprivation
of protection against insubstantial changes in the patented inven-
tion.19 Equity, then, reflected only "general fairness"' not a
doctrine which would grant the trial judge discretion over whether
it should be applied.22 However, in support of its argument that
the doctrine was one of law and not equity, the CAFC could cite
only Supreme Court cases decided in an era of much simpler
technologies. 2
Judge Plager's dissent in Hilton Davis questioned the court's
interpretation of the doctrine of equivalents as a doctrine of law.
Judge Plager stated that "[t]he majority essentially blesses the
118 Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521. The court stated that
[b]y referring to the doctrine as a doctrine of fairness, neither the
Supreme Court nor this court has invoked the myriad implications of
an alternative to legal remedies. In addition, neither the Supreme Court
nor this court has invoked equity in the technical sense of a set of
principles originating in England to compensate for the historically
harsh rules of common law.
Id. The CAFC in part framed the equitable approach as one in which the court
first decided whether the defendant had intended to copy the patented process.
Id. at 1523.
9 Id. at 1521 (referring to the explanation in Graver Tank that the doctrine
of equivalents achieved an "equitable" result).
12 Id. The court cited a number of its previous decisions in which it had
labeled the doctrine of equivalents an equitable doctrine. Id. at 1521 n.2 (citing
Texas Instruments Inc. v. U.S.I.T.C., 988 F.2d 1165, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 (Fed. Cir.
1987); Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1985),
overruled on other grounds by Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 46
U.S.P.Q.2d 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
121 Id. at 1522.
122 Id. at 1521, 1526 (citing Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S.
30, 42 (1929); Royer v. Schultz Belting Co., 135 U.S. 319, 325 (1890); Seymour
v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 556 (1871); Taylor v. Boston, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 327 (1869); Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 338 (1853)).
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continued unfettered use of the doctrine of equivalents, at the
discretion of a jury, noting that in some cases at least the ritual
chant [of function-way-result] will be quite sufficient justification
for a rewriting of the claimed limitations. 12 3 Judge Plager was
unconvinced that the court had at all established the doctrine as a
legal remedy,12 4 arguing instead that the doctrine was in fact an
equitable remedy available to mitigate the harshness of the literality
of claim drafting. 12 Whereas the claims defined a patentee's
statutorily-protected rights, a court, "in the exercise of its extraordi-
nary equity power" could provide a patentee protection not afforded
by statute. 2 6 Judge Plager made a good argument, therefore, that
the application of the doctrine of equivalents should be at the
discretion of a court, an argument ignored by the Supreme Court
when it heard the case.
D. The Supreme Court Refines the Doctrine of Equivalents
In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 2 7 the
Supreme Court upheld and refined the doctrine of equivalents.
1 21
'23 Id. at 1537 (Plager, J., dissenting). Judge Plager appearedquite suspicious
of jury decisions, particularly because juries give general verdicts with little
reasoning behind them. For example, Judge Plager quoted the jury's finding in
the Hilton Davis case: "We the jury, unanimously find that plaintiff Hilton Davis
has proved by a preponderance of the legal evidence that defendant Wamer-
Jenkinson has infringed [claims 1, 2, 3, 13, 14]." Id. at 1538 n.3.
124 Id. at 1541.
121 Judge Plager argued strongly that the language of the patent statute
prohibited the doctrine of equivalents. See id. at 1539-40. For example, Judge
Plager argued that 35 U.S.C. § 112 directs that the specification shall cover what
is distinctly claimed. Id. at 1539. Judge Plager also noted that at several points,
Congress had opportunities to incorporate the doctrine of equivalents into the
patent statutes by the simple addition of "and equivalents thereof" to the statutory
language defining claims, but failed to do so. Id. That failure, Judge Plager
opined, reflected Congress' desire for exactitude in patent claiming, an exactitude
diminished by application of the doctrine in every case. Id. at 1539-40. As a
result, he argued, the doctrine of equivalents, a judge-made doctrine which
softened the literality of claims, had to be equitable in nature. Id.
126 Id. at 1540.
127 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997).
128 Id. at 1054.
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Petitioner Warner-Jenkinson argued that the doctrine should be
eliminated because it had not survived the 1952 Patent Act.'29
Warner-Jenkinson further argued that the doctrine violated the
requirement that "the outer limits of each patent monopoly must be
defined with precision in the claims set forth in the patent," 3 '
and that "[t]he Federal Circuit's 'insubstantial differences' standard
... deprives the public, including other firms and inventors, of the
clear notice of patent boundaries that Congress has com-
manded.' 13' Further, Warner-Jenkinson reasoned, the 1952 Patent
Act contained no endorsement of the doctrine of equivalents;
therefore, the doctrine should be abandoned. 32 The Court respon-
ded that the doctrine had indeed survived the 1952 Patent Act, and
pointed to the failure of similar arguments in Justice Black's dissent
in Graver Tank.
133
The Court was, however, concerned with the potential for an
overbroad application of the doctrine, noting that "the doctrine of
equivalents, as it has come to be applied since Graver Tank, has
taken on a life of its own.' 134 Acknowledging that such an
application of the doctrine conflicted with the public notice
functions of patents, 135 the Supreme Court held that the doctrine
129 See Brief for Petitioner at 10-12, Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997) (No. 95-728).
130 Id. at 11.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 42-44. The Court also noted that pre- 1952 Patent Act precedent had
survived passage of the Act. Hilton Davis, 117 S. Ct. at 1048 (citing Aro Mfg.
Co. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 342 (1961)).
133 Id. at 1047 (referring to Justice Black's dissent in Graver Tank & Mfg.
Co. v. Linde Air Products Co. that the doctrine of equivalents was inconsistent
with the Patent Code's requirement of clear and distinct claims).
134 Id. at 1048-49.
135 Claims contained within a patent notify the public of what is patentable
by defining the invention and what constitutes infringement. See CHISUM &
JACOBS, supra note 15, at § 2D[3][d] (describing the properties of claims). This
public notice function is essential to the functioning of the patent system. See
London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
"[C]laims must be 'particular' and 'distinct'. . . so that the public has fair notice
of what the patentee and the Patent and Trademark Office have agreed constitute
the metes and bounds of the claimed invention. Notice permits other parties...
to design around the patent." Id. The Supreme Court noted in Hilton Davis that
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of equivalents was to be applied to each element of a claim. 36
Because each element is material to a patent's claims, equivalency
had to be determined for each element, rather than between an
invention and an accused product.'37 After Hilton Davis, a paten-
tee claiming infringement must show literal or equivalent infringe-
ment of each element of a claimed invention, not simply the
invention as a whole.
138
The Supreme Court was unconcerned as to whether a "function-
way-result" test139 or some other test was used, as long as "the
test is probative of the essential inquiry: Does the accused product
or process contain elements identical or equivalent to each claimed
element of the patented invention?"' 4 The Supreme Court explic-
itly left to the CAFC the actual application of the doctrine. 4'
Since Hilton Davis, the CAFC has not had the opportunity to apply
the newly-defined doctrine of equivalents in a case involving a
biotechnological invention.
The Court also emphasized that prosecution history estoppel
was an important limitation on the application of the doctrine of
equivalents.'42 In Hilton Davis, it was not clear to the Court from
the prosecution history why the patentee Hilton Davis had set the
"[t]here can be no denying that the doctrine of equivalents, when applied
broadly, conflicts with the definitional and public-notice functions of the
statutory claiming requirement." 117 S. Ct. at 1049.
136 Hilton Davis, 117 S. Ct. at 1049.
137 Id.
131 Id. The Court credited Judge Nies of the CAFC for reconciling the
Supreme Court positions that the doctrine of equivalents is desirable and that a
court has no right to expand a claim beyond its limitations. Nies had proposed
accomplishing this goal by requiring that the doctrine of equivalents be applied
to a claim element-by-element. See id. (citing Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v.
Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1573-74 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J.,
dissenting)).
13' As outlined in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339
U.S. 605, 609 (1950).
140 Hilton Davis, 117 S. Ct. at 1054.
141 Id. "[W]e see no purpose in going further and micro-managing the
CAFC's particular word-choice for analyzing equivalence. We expect that the
CAFC will refine the formulation of the test for equivalence in the orderly
course of case-by-case determinations .... Id.
142 Id. at 1049-50.
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lower pH bound for its ultrafiltration process as "approximately
6.0." 143 The lower pH limitation had been added during prosecu-
tion after the examiner had objected to the original claim, which
conflicted with a previous patent. The Court, therefore, enunc-
iated a rule that where, as in the current case, no explanation had
been given for the added, limiting element, "the court should
presume that the [Patent and Trademark Office] had a substantial
reason related to patentability for including the limiting element
added by amendment.' ' 45 Since each element contained within a
claim was material, 146 and since Hilton Davis had not provided
evidence to demonstrate that estoppel was precluded, the Supreme
Court remanded the case to the CAFC.
147
The Court left unanswered, however, the question of whether
judge or jury should be the factfinder. Noting that Warner-
Jenkinson's comments on the question went "more to the alleged
inconsistency between the doctrine of equivalents and the claiming
requirement than to the role of the jury in applying the doc-
trine, ' 14s the Court declined to address the issue. 49 The Court,
having redefined the doctrine of equivalents to its satisfaction,
remanded the case to the CAFC.
On remand, the CAFC, in an uncharacteristically brief decision,
again upheld the jury's verdict that Warner-Jenkinson's process
infringed Hilton Davis' patent under the doctrine of equiva-
lents. 50 In doing so, the CAFC retreated into an amalgam of the
function-way-result test and the insubstantial differences test,
holding that "one of ordinary skill in the art would know that
performing ultrafiltration at a pH of 5.0 will allow the membrane
141 Id. at 1050.
144 Id. The previous patent disclosed an ultrafiltration process operating at
pH greater than 9.0; it was not clear to the Court why the lower limit of
"approximately 6.0" was added. Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 1054.
141 Id. at 1053.
149 id.
"S' Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161,
1164 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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to perform substantially the same function in substantially the same
way to reach substantially the same result as performing ultrafiltra-
tion at 6.0."'"' As to the question, however, of whether Hilton
Davis was estopped by prosecution history from claiming infringe-
ment of the lower pH bound element, the CAFC remanded the case
to the district court to decide.152
The Supreme Court may have refined the doctrine of equiva-
lents by instituting an element-by-element approach, but the Court
is perceived to have left the matter as confusing as before.153 One
commentator has averred that the establishment of the element-by-
element analysis will "do nothing to dispel any of the current
uncertainty and confusion regarding the doctrine of equiva-
lents." 54 This is certainly true with respect to the biotech
industry.155 Natural product cases in which consumer-produced
"' Id. at 1164.
152 Id.
153 Professor Donald Chisun of the Santa Clara University School of Law
suggested that the Supreme Court's decision was an attempt at peacemaking
between the factions of the CAFC (the CAFC Hilton Davis decision was 7-5).
See Victoria Sind-Flor, High Courts [sic] Punts on Equivalents, NAT'L L.J., Mar.
17, 1997, at A6 (describing sources of confusion regarding the doctrine of
equivalents). The Supreme Court left unresolved whether a judge or jury would
act as factfimder to hear questions of equivalence, and the framework for deciding
equivalence. See Hilton Davis, 117 S. Ct. at 1053.
154 Levine, supra note 19, at 384. See also Robert D. Bajefsky & Howard
W. Levine, Impact of "Hilton Davis" on Biotech is Unclear, NAT'L L.J., June 16,
1997, at C9 (discussing the uncertainties inherent in the element-by-element
rule).
"' See, e.g., Bajefsky & Levine, supra note 154, at C9 (noting the difficulty
of applying the Supreme Court's version of the doctrine of equivalents to one
type of biotechnology product); Levine, supra note 19, at 384 (describing
implications of the Hilton Davis decision for the biotech industry). It is arguable
that an element-by-element approach provides no more guidance than the more
expansive CAFC approach. For example, the Supreme Court and the CAFC both
considered a single element, the lower pH bound of the ultrafiltration process,
in arriving at their respective decisions. See Hilton Davis, 117 S. Ct. at 1050;
Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1524 (Fed.
Cir. 1995). Similarly, in Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation, it was one
element, the activity of FE 1X, to which the doctrine of equivalents was applied.
29 F.3d 1555, 1563-65, 1567-69 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Micron Separations, which
submitted an amicus brief in support of Wamer-Jenkinson, had also been
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metabolites are elsewhere patented also remain confusing.1 56 In
general, "[d]issatisfaction with the doctrine of equivalents has
arisen despite general adherence to an all-elements rule, which
seems unlikely, by itself, to satisfy concerns about the unpredict-
ability of equivalence analysis.",157 The concerns about the doc-
trine of equivalents are well-founded. Part III of this Note discusses
several reasons why the biotechnology industry does not need even
a moderately broad doctrine of equivalents.
III. THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY DOES NOT NEED A BROAD
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
Judge Plager's dissent in the CAFC's Hilton Davis decision
suggested a semi-equitable approach to the application of the
doctrine of equivalents by which a judge would examine the
substantiality of differences between an invention and an accused
product and, based on that examination, decide whether the
involved in extensive litigation over a single element of another company's
patent, which the CAFC held Micron had infringed under the doctrine of
equivalents. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Micron Separations in Support of
Petitioner at 5, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 117 S. Ct.
1040 (1997)(No. 95-728) (describing the litigation); Pall v. Micron Separations,
Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (decidingthe litigation). The element-
by-element approach may be a refinement of the doctrine of equivalents, but the
refinement has not improved the resolution of these cases over the previous,
broader, CAFC approach.
'56 The question is whether a chemical product's metabolite, produced within
a consumer after ingestion, is the substantial equivalent of an existing patented
product with the same chemical structure; an element-by-element approach adds
no guidance to this problem. An example of such a product is terfenadine, sold
as Seldane®, an allergy medication. See Arthur R. Whale, Liver Cited as
Infringer, NAT'L L.J., May 12, 1997, at C29. Marion Merril Dow held the patent
for terfenadine. Id. Just before its patent expired, Baker Norton applied to the
FDA for approval to market terfenadine after expiration of Dow's patent, and the
FDA agreed. Id. Dow sued, however, because terfenadine is broken down in the
body into a metabolite, TAM, for which Dow still had an active patent. Id.
' Stephen L. Sulzer & Leo J. Jennings, Doctrine of Equivalents is not
Limited to Piracy, NAT'L L.J., May 12, 1997, at C32.
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doctrine is available to a plaintiff.158 This limited approach to the
doctrine of equivalents would work best for biotech products,
particularly DNA and protein products, because broad patents are
possible for biotech products, 5 9 the function-way-result test does
not fit biotech products well,' 60 juries may have difficulty under-
standing the concepts at issue, 16' and a broad doctrine of equiva-
lents, even one utilizing an element-by-element approach, tends to
suppress competition.
62
'5 Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1543-44 (Plager, J., dissenting). Judge Plager
stated that this determination of availability was separate from the question of
relief under the doctrine, a question left to a jury. Id. at 1544. Judge Plager
admitted that this approach may have problems in that a judge, in making the
initial determination of availability, may make some of the same function-way-
result determinations the jury would make. Id. This criticism, however, is hollow
in that judges frequently make evidentiary determinations while looking through
a jury's eyes, for example, while weighing the evidence involved in a summary
judgment motion. Also, Judge Plager's approach would allow a judge to
discourage the use of the doctrine (when not actually meritorious) as an intimida-
tion factor by the plaintiff. Judge Plager had even suggested eschewing the
doctrine of equivalents altogether. See id. at 1543; supra Part II (outlining
reasons why this option would be undesirable). In addition, Judge Nies of the
CAFC also held the doctrine of equivalents to be a mixed question of law and
fact. Id. at 1563 (Nies, J., dissenting).
"9 See infra Part III.A (describing how claims can be drafted broadly to
encompass equivalents).
160 See infra Part III.B (describing how the doctrine of equivalents does not
easily apply to biotechnological inventions).
161 See infra Part III.C (describing how juries have difficulty understanding
complex technical evidence such as might be presented at trial in a case
involving alleged infringement of a biotech patent).
162 See infra Part III.D (describing how the doctrine of equivalents can act
to discourage competition). It should be noted that the Biotechnology Industry
Organization, in its amicus brief to the Supreme Court, strongly supported the
doctrine of equivalents as applied to the biotech industry. See generally amicus
brief for the Biotechnology Industry Organization, Warner-Jenkinson Co. v.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997) (No. 95-728).
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A. Claims May Be Drafted Broadly To Encompass Equiva-
lents
A strong objection to consistent application of the doctrine of
equivalents to infringement actions involving biotechnological
inventions is that broad patent constructions are already avail-
able.'63 It is therefore possible to include many potential equiva-
lencies in a patent claim's language.' 64 The process of obtaining
'63 Broad patents may utilize specific claims so that potential equivalencies
may be included in the language of the claims. Such specificity is important; the
Supreme Court has said:
[T]he patent laws require that an applicant for a patent . . . "shall
particularly specify and point out the part, improvement, or combina-
tion which he claims as his own discovery." This provision was
inserted in the law for the purpose of relieving the courts from the
duty of ascertaining the exact invention of the patentee by inference
and conjecture, derived from a laborious examination of previous
inventions, and a comparison thereof with that claimed by him.
Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877). See, e.g.,
Shayana Kadidal, Digestion as Infringement: The Problem of Pro-Drugs, 78 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 241, 245-48 (1996) (discussing the claiming
of a spectrum of chemical compounds all metabolized to the same active
compound in the body). After Hilton Davis, William H. Dippert, a patent
attorney with Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C. advised using qualifiers such
as "about" or "approximately" or relying on value ranges in claims to "give your
client a better chance of equivalence." Dominic Bencivenga, Proving Infringe-
ment: Supreme Court Establishes Equivalence Test, N.Y. L.J., May 8, 1997, at
5.
" For example, consider the ultrafiltration process at issue in Hilton Davis.
See Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1515
(Fed. Cir. 1995). Hilton Davis could have protected itself by replacing the
imprecise lower limit "approximately 6.0" of the patent's claim with definite
language, such as "pH 5.0" or by replacing the range with "at any pH below
9.0."
An example of a patent which encompasses many equivalents is found in
Bio-Technology General Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Genentech held a patent on a process for the production of recombinant human
growth hormone (hGH). Id. at 1556. The patent claimed:
A method for producing human growth hormone which method
comprises [1 ] culturing bacterial transformants containing recombinant
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a patent involves correspondences with a patent examiner."'5 The
potential patentee desires broad claims, while the examiner tries to
limit the claims in accordance with patentability.'" An inventor
plasmids which will, in a transformant bacterium, express a gene for
human growth hormone unaccompanied by the leader sequence of
human growth hormone or other extraneous protein bound thereto, and
[2] isolating and purifying said expressed human growth hormone.
Id. at 1558. This claim is very general and inclusive, encompassing every type
of bacterium which could be transformed, every type of plasmid capable of
carrying the hGH gene, arguably any sequence of DNA which would produce
hGH, and practically every method of isolation or of purification of the products.
In one broad stroke, the number of potential equivalent processes is vastly
reduced. Bio-Technology General's ("BTG") process produced the protein by
expression of the hGH gene within bacteria, which resulted in inactive hGH
collecting in clumps called inclusion bodies. Id. at 1557. The inclusion bodies
were separated from the bacteria and the hGH reactivated. Id. BTG's process,
however, was held to infringe upon the Genentech patent because, despite
substantial differences between the two processes, BTG's process performed
essentially the same function in the same way so as to achieve the same result
as Genentech's process. Id. at 1558-60. The strength of Genentech's claim lay
in the broad scope of its claim's language.
165 See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 15, at § 2D[1] (describing the patent
examination process).
166 See Stephen G. Whiteside, Note, Patents Claiming Genetically
Engineered Inventions: A Few Thoughts on Obtaining Broad Property Rights, 30
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1019, 1021 (1996). If the examiner allows the claims, they
become part of the issued patent. See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 15, at
§ 2D[1]. A patent examiner may disallow a claim for overbroadness; in this case,
the inventor has tried to claim too much. See Whiteside, supra, at 1053-70
(discussing generic claims). Equivalencies disallowed during prosecution for lack
of enablement cannot, by prosecution history estoppel, be infringed by
subsequent inventors.
The scope of claims is frequently limited by material that is already patented
or part of the public domain; such material constitutes "prior art." See CHISUM
& JACOBS, supra note 15, at § 2C[5] (discussing what constitutes prior art);
Whiteside, supra, at 1034-36 (discussing the inability of an inventor to claim
prior art under the doctrine of equivalents). Prior art includes prior patents,
publications describing the art included in the inventor's current patent
application, anything in public use or on sale in the United States, and certain
trade secrets. See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 15, at § 2C[5]. Prior art can
determine what is not patentable on grounds of obviousness, 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
(1997), or lack of novelty, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a),(b),(d),(e),(g). For example, the
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tries to claim what he has actually invented in a manner that
encompasses as many minor variations on the invention as
possible.'67 Broad claims are still expressed in specific terms;
specificity of claiming, even when the claims are broad, is critical
in that it gives competitors notice of what has been patented.
1 68
Thus, an inventor may claim many equivalents and still give
sufficient notice of what he has patented.
Inventors patenting DNA molecules or proteins may make
generic claims. 169 This means that an inventor can claim classes
of elements when only one member of the class is used in the
invention, as long as the claim "[is] of a scope appropriate to the
invention disclosed by an applicant,"' 7 and the language of the
claim is sufficiently enabling.' 7' When an applicant satisfies these
upper pH limit on the Hilton Davis patent was set at 9.0 so as to avoid infringing
a previous patent. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 117
S. Ct. 1040, 1045-46 (1997). The previous patent represented prior art.
167 Whiteside, supra note 166, at 1024, 1050-56 (discussing broad claiming
for genetically engineered organisms and the effect of the doctrine of equivalents
thereupon). Claims reflecting only the inventor's work are too narrow in scope
because they do not effectively prevent a competitors' development of useful
variants of the work. Whiteside, supra note 166, at 1024.
168 See supra note 135 (describing the public notice function of patents).
169 See Whiteside, supra note 166, at 1069 (discussing the limits of generic
claims). See also Carty, supra note 63, at 209-10 (discussing how some
biotechnological patents need several representations of the invention to satisfy
the statutory enablement requirement).
7' Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
... Id. (referring specifically to claimed DNA sequences). The idea is that
one may substitute nucleotides in a DNA molecule or amino acids in a protein,
while altering the functionality of either molecule unsubstantially. See supra note
21 (discussing proteins). The specification, which includes the claims, must
enable a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art to make and use the invention
described in the claims. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1997); see also CHISUM & JACOBS,
supra note 15, at 2D[3][a] (describing enablement). Enablement is therefore a
limitation to broad claims. For example, in Amgen v. Chugai Pharm. Co., the
CAFC noted that applicants were entitled to broad generic claims. 927 F.2d at
1213. Amgen attempted to claim all erythropoietin gene analogs, but the CAFC
held that Amgen had described the making of too few analogs for the claim to
be enabling. Id. Another example arises when a bacterial expression system
involves a poorly-characterizedbacterial type; an applicant may not necessarily
claim that the expression system includes all species within that type. See In re
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requirements, he has effectively encompassed all variants which
could be construed as equivalents to the invention, even under the
most liberal definition of equivalency. 7 2 For example, an inven-
tor may claim all the DNA variants which encode a specific amino
acid sequence.1
73
Another method for accomplishing broad claims is to define
elements of a claim in terms of function, not simply in terms of
structure. 174 For example, since a monoclonal antibody is a
protein which reacts with other molecules, it may be described by
its functionality only, that being reactivity,175 or by both its
chemical characteristics and its functionality. 7 1 Similarly, a DNA
Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that since cyanobacteriawere
a poorly-characterizedgroup of bacteria, a claim involving an expression system
using one cyanobacterial species could not encompass all cyanobacterialspecies).
Nevertheless, if sufficient enablement for analogs is shown, many (or all) of
them may be claimed along with the invented molecule. See id. at 496.
172 Such a claim may not, however, encompass useful variants of the claimed
molecule in which sections were deleted or new components added, or in which
a functional fragment was used, as long as the new invention has a different
functionality than the patented one.
'71 See Whiteside, supra note 166, at 1069.
171 See Mueller, supra note 1, at 507. Mueller suggests "us[ing] plenty of
broad, functional language to describe what each element of the invention does,
and why it does it, and how it interacts with other elements, and not just what
the element is." Mueller, supra note 1, at 507. Such descriptions form the basis
for accusations of equivalency against later-developedtechnology. Mueller, supra
note 1, at 507. See also Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,
117 S. Ct. 1040, 1053 (1997) (holding that infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents is to be determined at the time of infringement, not at the time the
patent was issued).
' For example, a claim could read "High affinity monoclonal IgM
antibodies immunoreactive with antigen X." Seide & Szanto, supra note 20, at
449. Such a claim refers only to the antibody's action. Seide & Szanto, supra
note 20, at 449.
176 For example, a claim could read "A monoclonal antibody which lyses
human C cells in vitro in the presence of complement, said antibody recognizing
an antigenic determinant on the surface of human C cells having a molecular
weight of about 50-60 kD as determined by SDS-Page electrophoresis on a 10%
polyacrylamide slab gel." Seide & Szanto, supra note 20, at 451. A monoclonal
antibody may also be claimed by the process of making it, a description of the
epitope (the part of another molecule recognized by the antibody) and activity,
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molecule may be claimed by its sequence, or by its function of
producing a particular amino acid sequence. 177 In general, claims
of DNA molecules that encompass the encoded protein's functions
are broader than those that encompass only sequence or chemical
characteristics. 178
The patentee is protected, as well, against claims that are
initially drafted too narrowly.179 The Patent Act allows for the
reissue of claims in broader terms when the defect in the claim is
attributable to failure to draft claims broadly enough to encompass
the invention.18 0 Therefore, despite the relative unpredictability
of biotechnology, the patentee has the benefit of some hindsight to
protect his or her invention.
With the availability of broad claim drafting, inventors have no
real need for ready access to the doctrine of equivalents. In general,
if an accused product or process is an equivalent to a patented
product or process, the patent's claims likely could have been
drafted more broadly to encompass that equivalent. Conversely,
prosecution history estoppel prevents patentees from claiming
works which were disallowed during the patenting process. "'
Both broad claim drafting and prosecution history estoppel argue
against easy availability of the doctrine to a patentee.
by association with the cell line which produces it, or simply by its producing
cell line. Seide & Szanto, supra note 20, at 444, 449-50. Since monoclonal
antibodies are themselves highly specific in action, claims for them may be
broadened by describing only the antibody's activity, without regard to how or
by which cell line it was produced. Seide & Szanto, supra note 20, at 444.
177 See Seide & Szanto, supra note 20, at 454-55 (describing claims for
DNA molecules).
171 See, e.g., Diana Sheiness, Patenting Gene Sequences, 78 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 121, 127-28 (1996) (discussing DNA claims of varying
breadth and increasing the breadth by including a functional element).
179 See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1997) (outlining the reissue of defective patents;
"[w]henever any patent is, through error without any deceptive intention, deemed
wholly or partially invalid by reason ... of the patentee claiming... less than
he had a right to claim in the patent, the Commissioner shall ... reissue the
patent.. . "); Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d
1565, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (outlining the court's view of patent reissue).
"o See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1988) (describing the reissue process).
181 See supra note 66 (discussing prosecution history estoppel).
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B. The Doctrine of Equivalents is Not Readily Applied to
Biotech Products
The "function-way-result" test as outlined in Graver Tank"8 2
and accepted by the Supreme Court in Hilton Davis does not apply
easily to biotechnology.'83 This failure of the test reflects the
unusual properties of the molecules and processes involved in
biotechnology, whereby an inventor may take several different
paths to reach the same result. Similarly, the substantial similarities
test espoused by the CAFC is difficult to apply to biotechnological
products. In general, as the Supreme Court and CAFC have
articulated its application, the doctrine of equivalents is not easily
applied to biotech products.
The difficulties posed by the function-way-result test become
apparent when considering, for example, a protein product which
has a useful medical application. The protein can be purified from
some natural source, or it can be produced artificially. To produce
it artificially, a researcher will require a gene for the protein, a
"82 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09
(1950).
... Judge Lourie of the CAFC noted that the function-way-result test does
not apply well to chemistry:
New chemical compounds differ structurally from old compounds (that
is what makes them new) and yet they may perform the same function
(have the same use), provide the same result, and do so in the same
way. The fact that they do so in the same way does not make them
substantially the same in the way they are defined, i.e., by structure.
Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1546 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (Lourie, J., dissenting). Judge Lourie's discomfort with the application
of the doctrine of equivalents to chemistry speaks to biotechnology as well, since
many biotech patents are similarly described in terms of structure, that is, the
DNA or protein sequence. See generally Whiteside, supra note 166 (describing
the claiming of DNA molecules by structure). Changes in the structure of either,
which results in chemically distinct molecules, may result in molecules that
perform the same function in the same way to achieve the same result. See supra
note 21 (describing the effect of modifications of DNA and protein sequence on
protein function).
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DNA vector for the gene, 184 and a microbial system for its
production, most likely a bacterium.'85 The gene/vector combina-
tion transforms the bacterium genetically. 86 The researcher then
induces the transformed bacteria to produce useful quantities of the
protein.'87 This protein will have a certain characteristic acti-
vity.188 The researcher then claims this protein in his or her
patent.
Infringement questions arise, however, if a competitor tries to
produce a competing protein product. Since many, perhaps
millions, of sequence-unique genes may encode the exact same
protein, I1 9 a competitor can construct a new, artificially-produced
gene to encode the protein. Alternatively, the competitor can
modify the existing gene to produce a protein with a different
sequence, but one which has a similar activity to the claimed
protein.' 90 A competitor may alter the gene so that it contains all
the preferred codons' 9' for the bacteria producing the protein,
increasing production of the protein. In each case, a competitor
.84 This vehicle is usually a small circle of DNA known as a plasmid. See
ALBERTS, supra note 21, at 259.
185 See ALBERTS, supra note 21, at 265-66 (describing the use of bacteria to
produce proteins in the laboratory).
186 See ALBERTS, supra note 21, at 265.
187 See ALBERTS, supra note 21, at 265.
i88 A protein's useful activity consists of its ability to accelerate useful
biochemical reactions. ALBERTS, supra note 21, at 125 (describing the catalytic
activity of a class of proteins called enzymes); see also Genentech, Inc. v.
Wellcome Found., 29 F.3d 1555, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (describing artificially-
produced tissue plasminogen activator and its effects on blood clots); Amgen,
Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (describing the
effect of the protein erythropoietin on the production of red blood cells).
189 See, e.g., Genentech, 29 F.3d at 1562-63, 1565-67 (discussing the
different activities of two variants of tissue plasminogen activator, t-PA and
FE lX).
390 See id. at 1559 (describing a claim by Genentech of infringement of its
patent for recombinant tissue plasminogen activator (t-PA) by two artificially-
produced t-PAs with sequences different from that patented by Genentech).
191 See supra note 21 (describing codons and the conversion of a DNA
sequence into a protein sequence).
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may attempt to patent both the protein product and the method for
making it. 1
92
In these scenarios, it is not clear how the doctrine of equiva-
lents would be applied. If the accused protein's sequence exactly
matches the patented protein, there is literal infringement. 93 But
if there are significant sequence changes, there is no literal infringe-
ment, particularly if the activity of the accused protein differs
significantly from the patented one. It then becomes difficult to tell
if the new protein infringes under the doctrine of equivalents. If a
protein's sequence or activity is a material element in a claim, it is
not clear how much difference between the claimed and accused
sequences or activities is "substantial.' ' 194 If the sequences them-
selves are material elements, discerning equivalence can be
problematic as well.
The question of equivalent infringement by a product previously
patented, but produced by a different process, was addressed in
Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.19
Scripps Clinic was the holder of a patent for the production of
human Factor VIII:C.196 Scripps Clinic engaged in the production
of Factor VIII:C by purifying it from human or porcine blood. 97
Several of the claims at issue referred to the Factor's purification
from "plasma" and the separation of VIII:C from VIII:RP, a second
protein.' 9' Five other claims at issue in the case were product-by-
192 See, e.g., Genentech, 29 F.3d at 1558 (reciting claims contained in
Genentech patents for both tissue plasminogen activator and the process for
creating it).
193 This assumes that the patent contains a recitation of the protein's
sequence. The patent may, however, contain only a description of the protein's
functionality. See, e.g., id. (reciting one patent claim of "Human plasminogen
activator, having thrombolytic properties... and having a specific activity of
500,000 IU/mg").
194 See infra note 229 (discussing several problems associated with a range
of activity element in one claim at issue in Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Founda-
tion).
'1 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
196 Id. at 1568. Factor VIII:C is a clotting factor found in the blood. Id. It
is useful in place of whole blood in the treatment of hemophilia. Id. at 1568-69.
I ld. at 1569.
198 Id. at 1570 (referring to claims 24-27).
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process claims.' 99 Genentech, however, developed a new and
useful method of producing human Factor VIII:C through recombi-
nant DNA technology.2°° Scripps Clinic argued that Genentech's
human Factor VIII:C infringed both its product 0' and product-
by-process claims.2 02 The district court granted Scripps summary
judgment on its product claims, but not for its product-by-process
claims.
203
The CAFC, however, held that summary judgment was
inappropriate for the product claims, as there was a genuine
question of material fact as to the purity and specific activities of
the VIII:C produced by the two processes.2" The CAFC also held
that, as a matter of law, "the correct reading of product-by-process
claims is that they are not limited to product prepared by the
process set forth in the claims., 20 5 This broad view, however, was
rejected the following year by a different panel of the CAFC in
Atlantic Thennoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp.20 6 That panel held
that the process recited in a product-by-process claim is a material
element of the claim.20 7 The conflict between the two cases is not
yet completely settled.208
'" Product-by-process claims are claims that describe the product by the
method in which it is produced. See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 15, at
§ 2D[3][d][vi] (describing product-by-process claims).
200 Scripps Clinic & Research Found., 927 F.2d at 1580.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 1583.
203 Id. at 1580, 1583.
204 Id. at 1580.
205 Id. at 1583. Judge Newman's rationale for this holding was that claims
were to be construed the same way when determining validity as when
determining infringement. Id.
206 970 F.2d 834, 839 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
207 Id. at 846-47. This panel of the CAFC rejected the earlier attempt in
Scripps to equalize the construing of claims during patent prosecution and during
litigation on a claim. Id.
208 See, e.g., Tropix, Inc. v. Lumigen, Inc., 825 F. Supp. 7, 10 (D. Mass.
1993) (following, despite "the confused state of the record," the CAFC's decision
in Atlantic Thermoplastics Co.); Dekalb Genetics Corp. v. Northrup King Co.,
No. 96 C 50169, 1997 WL 587492, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 14, 1997) (expressly
following Scripps Clinic & Research Found. over Atlantic Thermoplastics Co.)
Most courts, however, follow Atlantic Thermoplastics Co.
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Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation and its subsequent
rejection by Atlantic Thermoplastics represent two conflicting
interests in biotechnology. Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation
is rational in that the inventor of a biologically useful molecule
should be able to patent that molecule regardless of the method by
which it is made. The case also upholds the desirable broad
claiming that can make biotech patents valuable assets. The holding
on product-by-process claims, however, leads to the illogical result
that two completely different processes could be equivalent. 209
Conversely, an adherence to the Atlantic Thermoplastics holding on
product-by-process claims reduces the value of biotech patents
utilizing such claims, and leads to the illogical result that the same
molecule may be patented by two different inventors.210
A case that further underscores the difficulty in applying the
doctrine of equivalents to biotechnology is Genentech, Inc. v
Wellcome Foundation.2 ' The protein product in controversy was
tissue plasminogen activator ("t-PA"), which is medically useful for
dissolving life-threatening blood clots. 21 2 Genentech held three
patents on natural and recombinant t-PA, and several means of
producing it.213 Genentech sued the Wellcome Foundation for
producing and importing met-t-PA, a form of t-PA which differed
from Genentech's t-PA by only one amino acid.21 4 Genentech
also sued a co-defendant, Genetics Institute ("GI"), for producing
FE1X, a form of t-PA which lacked significant protein segments
found in Genentech's t-PA, yet still retained blood clot-dissolving
209 Under the function-way-result test, the two processes could not be said
to result in production of the molecule in the same "way."
210 The Supreme Court noted that an accused product falling within the
literal scope of a claim may avoid infringement if it is "so far changed in
principle from a patented article that it performs the same or a similar function
in a substantially different way .... "Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air
Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1950). This is known as the reverse
doctrine of equivalents. See Scripps, 927 F.2d at 1581. The CAFC noted that a
defendant had to differentiate between his product and a patent's claims in terms
of function in order to prevail under the reverse doctrine of equivalents. Id.
211 29 F.3d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
212 Id. at 1557.
213 Id. at 1559.
214 Id. at 1559 n.4.
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activity of t-pa.1 s The jury found that both companies had
infringed Genentech's patent under the doctrine of equivalents. 6
The CAFC held that the lower court should have granted GI
judgment as a matter of law that FEIX did not infringet A217
Genentech's patent on - .
The Wellcome Foundation decided after trial to discontinue
production of their t-PA.2" s Thus, the question of infringement of
Genentech's patent on t-PA by met-t-PA under the doctrine of
equivalents was not addressed by the CAFC.2 9 Genentech's
claims to its recombinant t-PA were drafted broadly and referred
to the t-PAs activity rather than its structure. 2 20 However, had
Genentech recited an amino acid sequence for the t-PA in its
claims, it is arguable that Genentech would have had a claim of
infringement by equivalence against the Wellcome Foundation
because the difference between Wellcome's met-t-PA and
Genentech's t-PA, the addition of methionine, would be insubstan-
tial. 221  Under an element-by-element analysis, however,
Genentech, before arguing to a jury that the Wellcome met-t-PA
differed unsubstantially from Genentech's t-PA, would have had to
first argue what constituted an element of the claim, a matter
currently unclear.222
215 Id.
216 Id. at 1560.
217 Id. at 1569.
218 Id. at 1560.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 1558.
221 See Whiteside, supra note 166, at 1049-50.
222 See Bajefsky & Levine, supra note 154, at C9 (discussing the problematic
application of the "all elements" rule to protein and DNA sequences). It is not
clear whether the protein sequence itself comprises one element of the claim, or
if each amino acid of the protein sequence is an element. Bajefsky & Levine,
supra note 154, at C9. Under the CAFC conception of the doctrine of equiva-
lents, the factfinder may be able to find infringement more easily than under the
Supreme Court's element-by-element analysis, because it could look at the
invention - the t-PA - as a whole to determine infringement under the function-
way-result test. In an element-by-element analysis, however, a factfmder would
have to determine the equivalence of the sequences exclusive of the equivalence
of the t-PA's function, a different element than the sequence.
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It is even less clear whether a factfinder using an element-by-
element analysis would find equivalence between Genentech's t-PA
and GI's FEIX, since a much greater disparity exists between their
respective sequences.2 23 A factfinder would have to determine if
the sequence of GI's FEIX performed the same "function in the
same way so as to achieve the same result" as Genentech's t-PAs
sequence, regardless of t-Ps function, a separate element. If the
CAFC adopted a rule that each amino acid in a sequence is an
element, GI's FE1X sequence would lack a large number of
elements contained in the Genentech t-PA. An equivalence
question, therefore, might never reach the jury.224 Ironically,
examining the whole protein for equivalence of function may not
be an option under an element-by element analysis. The element-
by-element refinement to the doctrine of equivalents, therefore, has
created at least as much confusion as it has cured.
Another example of equivalence problems arises when the
specific activity of a protein is an element of a claim. In
Genentech, Genentech's t-PA had a specific activity of 500,000
IU/mg plus or minus 25%, or a specific activity of 375,000 IU/mg
to 625,000 IU/mg.2 25 FEIX, however, had an activity range of
Although Genentech did not recite a protein sequence when claiming its
recombinant t-PA, the CAFC decided the case as if it had. The CAFC noted that
Genentech's specification in one of the patents litigated upon gave several
different apparent definitions of "tissue plasminogen activator." Genentech, Inc.
v. Wellcome Found., 29 F.3d 1555, 1563-65 (1994). Of the four definitions, the
CAFC chose the narrowest, "t-PA produced through recombinant DNA
technology but having the same structure as natural t-PA." Id. at 1563. Thus, the
CAFC in effect imposed upon Genentech's claim an element of structure which
in future litigation would be considered an element in and of itself. Indeed, the
district court that first heard the case interpreted the phrase "tissue plasminogen
activator" in the claims to mean "the full length amino acid sequence of human
t-PA plus any 'naturally-occurring allelic variant' thereof." Id. at 1560.
223 See id. at 1559 n.4.
224 See Bajefsky & Levine, supra note 154, at C9 (describing the effects of
the element-by-element analysis on the presentation of a sequence-element-
infringement issue to a factfmder).
225 Genentech, 29 F.3d. at 1563. The specific activity of an enzyme is
generally expressed as a particular number of International Units per milligram
of enzyme, or IU/mg. IRWIN H. SEGEL, BIOCHEMICAL CALCULATIONS 282 (2d
ed. 1976). "One International Unit (IU) is the amount of enzyme which catalyzes
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208,000 IU/mg to 299,000 IU/mg.2 26 The figure of 500,000
IU/mg for Genentech's t-PA was added to distinguish it from prior
art.227 The CAFC held that the activity of FEIX fell outside the
range of activity of Genentech's t-PA,2 8 and that FEIX was
"thus outside the permissible range of equivalents through the
application of prosecution history estoppel. ' ' 229 Presumably if the
average of the accused protein's activity had fallen within the
patented protein's equivalence range, it would have infringed upon
the patent.
It is not clear, however, if infringement by equivalence could
have been found if the activity ranges had overlapped slightly For
the formation of [one micromole] of product per minute under defined
conditions." Id. A protein's activity will depend upon the method or assay used
to determine that activity. See Genentech, 29 F.3d at 1562-63, 1566 (discussing
two assays for determining the activity of t-PA, the bovine fibrin binding assay
and the chromogenic substrate assay). When comparing the activities of two
proteins, it is important to use the same assay in testing both. Id. at 1566.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 1563.
228 Id. at 1567.
229 Id. at 1565-66. It should be noted that the range "plus or minus 25%" is
arbitrary. The CAFC recounted the testimony of Dr. Collen, who stated that "the
'consensus attitude' of those who work in the area is that, if an assay [for protein
activity] is performed 'properly and carefully', the resulting measurement for
native t-PA should be 500,000 plus or minus 25%." Id. at 1567 n.32. However,
the activity reported depended entirely upon the assay used. Id. at 1566
(differentiating the bovine fibrin binding assay and chromogenic substrate assay).
The activity of FE IX was reported using a chromogenic substrate assay. Id. The
reported activity for FE IX was 350,000 IU/mg to 450,000 IU/mg. Id. at 1565-66.
However, the t-PA was tested using the bovine fibrin plate assay. Id. at 1566. By
this assay, FE IX had an activity of 440,000 IU/mg. Id. Although the plaintiffs
argued that the two assays gave comparable results, the court held otherwise. Id.
Had the court accepted the published activity of FE I X, it likely would have held
that FE1X infringed Genentech's patent. However, the court ignored the
published figures and held that "the only evidence in the record which is
probative on the question of the specific activity of [the FE1X] is the testimony
of plaintiff s expert Dr. Mann," who testified that the range of activity of FE 1X
was 208,000 IU/mg to 299,000 IU/mg. Id. This figure fell outside Genentech's
t-PA's range of activity; thus, there was no infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. Id. at 1567. Clearly, the arbitrariness of the court's choice of what
evidence to believe in this case protected GI from liability for infringement.
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example, if the average activity of the accused t-PA had been
310,000 IU/mg, an average well outside the equivalence range of
the patented t-PA, the upper end of its equivalence range would
have been 387,500 IU/mg and within the patented protein's
equivalence range. Also unclear is the question of how much
overlap between activity ranges would constitute equivalence. The
answers are not forthcoming under either the CAFC's or the
Supreme Court's conception of the doctrine of equivalents.131 It
is apparent, however, that proteins with higher activities are
accorded a greater range activity, and therefore a greater range of
equivalents. This might provide companies with an incentive to
exaggerate claims of activity in order to claim more under this
element.
C. Juries May Have Trouble Understanding the Concepts at
Issue
As biotechnology has matured as an industry, biotech compan-
ies, particularly the larger ones, have become more litigious.
2 31
230 The CAFC's emphasis on substantiality of difference is of no help
because the CAFC has not defined substantiality in reference to activity ranges.
See generally id. Likewise, an element-by-element approach provides no relief
because a protein's activity range is a single element, and the question therefore
reduces to one of substantiality of difference.
23 See generally WILLIAM S. FELLER ET AL., AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION BIOTECHNOLOGY LITIGATION REPORT No. 5
(1997) (describing the status of patent litigations in biotechnology over the last
20 years). Feiler marks the beginning of the biotechnology litigation era with the
filing of the case Diamond v. Chakrabarty. Id. at Preface (noting Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40 (Cust. & Pat. App. 1978)). Since then, 259 cases have
been filed; many are still pending. Id. The pace of litigation picked up in the mid
1980s, with at least 15 actions a year from 1987 to date. Id. A high of 44 actions
were filed in 1996. Id. The largest companies have filed the most suits. For
example, Genentech has filed 24, Amgen 16, De Kalb Genetics 12, Monsanto 11
and Cetus 11. Id. See also Lynn H. Pasahow, Patent and Trade Secret
BiotechnologyLitigation, C886 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 37,42 (1993) (stating that "[m]any
biotech companies are controlled by venture capitalists . .. [and that t]hese
people are often greater risk-takers, and are more willing to litigate in order to
try to achieve exceptional future returns rather than eliminate risks by settling
and allowing their future profits to be diluted"). The pace of patent litigation in
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With this increased tendency to sue comes the increased likelihood
that large, scientifically-complex cases will come to trial. Since
equivalence is a matter of fact to be determined by a jury,232 a
jury of laypersons will have to sift through factual material
completely unfamiliar to them. 33 The jury is a cornerstone of the
American legal system, but it is a weak foundation on which to lay
the doctrine of equivalents.234
Several studies have shown that juries have serious problems
understanding cases when they involve factual material that is
complex, unfamiliar, or both.235 In particular, juries had trouble
general is increasing; one Chicago-area publication reported in 1997 that patent
cases there had increased 25% since 1992 to 1,840 suits. See H. Lee Murphy,
Patently Offered. Lawsuits Rise Over Corporate Cribbings, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus.,
Apr. 14, 1997, at 4.
232 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040,
1053 (1997) (approving the CAFC's holding that equivalency was a question of
fact for the jury). See also Sind-Flor, supra note 153, at A6 (noting that juries
will likely now have a free hand to decide equivalence questions). Kenneth R.
Adamo, a patent attorney, commenting on the Supreme Court's acquiescence to
the Federal Circuit's decision to leave equivalence questions to the jury, said
"Justice Thomas did a surprisingly good job, but he dropped the ball on that
issue." Sind-Flor, supra note 153, at A6.
233 Jurors may have the cultural background and experience to understand a
new set of facts in a trial involving homicide or the question of liability in an
auto accident because they have seen accounts of murders on television or have
experienced accidents. Jurors may easily understand what motivates a person to
murder, or what would lead to liability in an accident. Most jurors, however,
have no such familiar points of reference for the factual technical aspects of
biotechnology upon which they may base a verdict of infringement.
234 See infra notes 235-242 and accompanying text (discussing problems
juries have understanding technically complex evidence).
235 See Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons
From Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 752-76 (1991) (describing
problems juries have in understanding material presented in complex trials). The
Special Committee on Jury Comprehension of the American Bar Association's
Litigation Section studied jury decisionmaking in complex cases. Id. at 752. The
volume of evidence was not important when familiar issues were at stake. Id. at
753-54. For example, in a sexual harassment action, jurors felt comfortable with
the volume of evidence. Id. However, a trade secrets case proved problematic in
that jurors "had trouble deciding one of the claims because of the large volume
of evidence they had to consider." Id. at 754. Jurors differed widely in their
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understanding technical or scientific evidence,"' in part because
of a lack of a technical background." 7 This disturbing weakness
is exacerbated by the tendency of many courts to "discourage the
selection of technically competent and highly educated individuals
for jury service."23 8 This trend is particularly troubling consider-
ing that the Supreme Court in Hilton Davis reaffirmed the jury's
role in deciding infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 3 9
Jury trials pose other problems as well. Neither the Supreme
Court nor the CAFC has defined for a jury "insubstantiality of
differences. '240 Findings of equivalency, as determinations of
ability to understand a complex case's issues, with several jurors becoming
utterly confused. Id. See also Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific
Evidence: VI. Addressing the Problems of Complex and Scientific Evidence, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1583, 1585 (1995) (describing problems in the comprehen-
sion of scientific evidence).
236 Cecil, supra note 235, at 756. Judges and juries both perceive scientifi-
cally complex evidence as causing juror confusion. Cecil, supra note 235, at 757.
In particular, jurors may not interpret statistical evidence correctly, even failing
to differentiate in one case between statistical evidence strongly implicating a
defendant's guilt and similar evidence pointing only weakly to guilt. Cecil,
supra note 235, at 757-58, 760. Moreover,jurors may misunderstand quantitative
evidence as well. Cecil, supra note 235, at 760.
237 Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 235, at 1585 (addressing the
problems lay jurors have with understanding technically-complexevidence). One
jury foreman noted "If you can find a jury that's both [sic] a computer
technician, a lawyer, an economist, knows all about that stuff, yes, I think you
could have a qualified jury, but we don't know anything about that." ILC
Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423,447 (N.D. Cal. 1978)
(involving an assertion by Memorex that IBM had attempted to monopolize
various computer markets).
238 Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 235, at 1585. Further, courts
often "routinely excuse doctors, dentists, lawyers, and professionals from jury
duty." Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 235, at 1585 n.13.
239 Eugene C. Rzucidlo, Patent Prosecution: Be Careful What You Say, 15
NATURE BIOTECH. 1305, 1305 (1997) (noting that after the Supreme Court
decisions of Markman v. Westview Instruments, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996), and
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997),
patent applications, once written for technically-trained patent examiners, must
now be written for the judges and juries who will decide the scope of patent
claims).
240 Richard Zachar of the Chicago firm of Vedder Price Kaufnan &
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fact, are reversible only under the "substantial evidence" standard,
under which a jury's findings of fact may not be disturbed on
appeal unless the court on appeal finds that no reasonable juror
could have made the finding.24" ' Additionally, post-trial motions
for new trials under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure can delay a final resolution.
2 42
The court system itself has been criticized as a forum for
evaluating scientific evidence.2 43 Because experts for each party
act as advocates for their respective party's position, rather than as
neutral observers, scientific evidence may be incompletely
presented.244 In addition, lawyers present only evidence favorable
Kanimholz, an intellectual property attorney for 28 years, said "The million-
dollar question is: How do you know what insubstantial is? It's left for juries to
decide." Murphy, supra note 231, at 4. Other issues left unresolved by the courts
and left for juries are what constitutes a claim element, what it "take[s] to vitiate
a claim, and what kind of equivalent undermines an invention," Bencivenga,
supra note 163, at 5 (quoting patent attorney Kate Murashige of Morrison &
Foerster, Washington D.C.).
241 Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 821 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(discussing the standard of review of a jury's findings of fact).
242 See FED. R. Civ. P. 50; Avern Cohn, Letter to the Editor, 15 IPL NEWS-
LETTER 28 (Summer 1997) (noting the time involved in deciding a Rule 50
motion). The filing of a motion for new trial as a matter of law under Rule 50
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is common after a jury-decided patent
case, and can take longer to decide than a similar inquiry following a bench trial.
Id. While bench trials are not necessarily better than jury trials, adherence to jury
trials in the context of a readily-available doctrine of equivalents can therefore
lengthen litigation.
243 Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, supra note 235,
at 1586 (discussing the problems of experts in trials).
244 Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 235, at 1586. One perceived
problem is that of dueling experts, some of whom may be "willing to testify to
virtually anything for the right price." Confronting the New Challenges, supra
note 235, at 1586. Generally this should not be a real problem in patent actions,
as the experts tend to be the developing scientists themselves rather than hired
experts. See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found., 29 F.3d 1555, 1563 n. 17,
1566 n.32 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (testimony given by Dr. Collen of Leuven Research
& Development, a plaintiff, and Dr. Goeddel of Genentech, both of whom
worked directly on the development of t-PA). However, pride in work and the
sometimes high monetary stakes of an infringement action can create pressures
to provide desired testimony. Sometimes the confusion simply reflects conflicting
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to their clients' positions. If experts and attorneys present deliber-
ately incomplete evidence, a jury may fill in gaps with common
experience.245 This gap-filling for scientific evidence, however,
is not possible when jurors have little or no scientific experi-
ence.
246
A judge is in a better position to determine a factual issue of
equivalency. The Supreme Court in Markman v Westview
Instruments, Inc.,2 47 held that a judge must construe the scope of
a claim as a matter of law.241 "The construction of written instru-
ments is one of those things that judges often do and are likely to
do better than jurors unburdened by training in exegesis. '249 In
construing the meaning of claims, a judge must take into account
evidentiary matters.25 0 For example, the district court judge in
Genentech construed Genentech's claim for "tissue plasminogen
activator" to mean "the full length amino acid sequence of human
t-PA plus any 'naturally-occurring allelic variant' thereof.
21'
Thus, a judge is in a position relatively early in litigation to
determine, based upon the particular art in question, if there is any
data. Such confusion between experts is illustrated in Genentech with respect to
the confusion in the determination of the activity of the proteins in question. For
a discussion of Genentech and the confusion of the range of activity of t-PA, see
supra Part IM.B.
245 See Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 235, at 1587.
246 See Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 235, at 1587.
247 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
248 Id. at 1393-96 (analyzing the Court's role in interpreting claim language).
See generally Frank M. Gasparo, Note, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.
and Its Procedural Shockwave: The Markman Hearing, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 723
(1997) (outlining the evidentiary and procedural implications of the Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc. decision).
249 Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1395.
250 Id. at 1395 ("[lt often becomes necessary that [judges] should avail
themselves in the light furnished by experts relevant to the significance of
[unfamiliar] words and phrases.").
251 Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Found., 29 F.3d 1555, 1560 (quoting
Genentech, Inc. v. WellcomeFound., 14U.S.P.Q.2d 1363, 1369 (D. Del. 1990)).
The CAFC held that "human tissue plasminogen activator" meant "natural t-PA,"
id. at 1565, but did not disturb the district court's ruling on the inclusion of
naturally-occurring variants within that definition. Id. at 1565 n.27.
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merit to an assertion of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. 2
This reasoning applies to the appeals process as well. The
CAFC was created to hear patent cases, as well as a limited number
of other matters.5 3 It has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
patent cases arising in lower district courts.254 Because of this
narrow jurisdiction, the CAFC's judges are presumed to have more
experience in understanding the language and constructions of
patent claims than other courts, and arguably more than a jury of
laypersons.
The jury, therefore, is a weak link in the determination of
equivalence in questions involving biotechnology. This weakness
is evident under either the CAFC's or the Supreme Court's view of
the doctrine of equivalents. If a juror is confused under the CAFC's
view as to whether an accused product or process is substantially
equivalent to a patented product or process, that juror will likely be
as confused in determining under the Supreme Court's view
whether the accused product or process is the substantial equivalent
of each element of a patent's claim, since each element is viewed
in the context of the entire invention. The Supreme Court's view
provides no relief because, as in Hilton Davis, the dispute centered
around a potentially difficult-to-understand element. The alternative,
allowing a judge to first decide if a plaintiff may invoke the
doctrine of equivalents, is the more reasonable approach.
252 Judge Plager of the CAFC noted that before 1870, "the date when
inventors were first statutorily required to particularly and distinctly claim their
invention[,]... the scope of protection turned on the embodiments disclosed in
the specification. Courts read these specifications broadly, to include equivalents,
in order to give the patentee the full scope of an invention." Hilton Davis
Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
253 Federal Court Improvements Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 25 (1982) (codified
as amended in 28 U.S.C. et. seq.).
254 See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A), (B) (1997).
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D. The Doctrine of Equivalents, Even One Utilizing an
Element-By-Element Approach, Acts to Suppress
Competition
The application of patent law to biotechnology has occasionally
proved problematic.255 The doctrine of equivalents also creates
economic problems for the biotechnology industry because it may
not significantly reduce the risk of illegitimate competition while
at the same time affording larger companies a legal weapon to use
against smaller companies.
Judge Newman of the CAFC noted in her concurrence to Hilton
Davis256 that the purpose of the doctrine of equivalents was to
"adjust[] the relationship between the originator and the second-
comer who bore neither the burden of creation nor the risk of
failure."257 However, the development of new biotechnologically-
produced drugs is nearly as burdensome and risky for second-
comers as for innovators because every new drug, no matter how
similar to a patented drug, must pass through the FDA's extensive
approval procedure.258 Judge Newman also noted that "the paten-
tee ... may be encouraged [to develop new products] by the
broader commercial protection of the doctrine of equivalents.
259
However, much of the development in biotechnology does not
necessarily respond primarily to risk and the potential scope of
claims.260 For example, university research laboratories, which
255 See supra note 12 (discussing several problems arising from the
application of patent law to biotechnology).
256 Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d 1512, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1995)(Newman, J.,
concurring).
257 Id. at 1531. According to Judge Newman, the risk of innovation in
technical fields tends to be high, and a policy of literal claim reading unduly
lowers the risk of innovation to competitors as opposed to pioneering inventors.
Id. at 1532. The doctrine of equivalents ostensibly protects the innovator from
opportunistic, unsubstantially-innovating competitors, thereby encouraging
substantial innovation. Id.
25 For a discussion of FDA-mandated drug trials see supra Part I.B.
259 Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1533.
260 See Yusing Ko, An Economic Analysis of Biotechnology Patent
Protection, 102 YALE L.J. 777, 793 (1992).
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perform research for prestige and to expand general knowledge,
work under government grants and are not constrained by profit
motive.26' Many biotech companies work in alliance with such
research labs. Thus, application of the doctrine of equivalents may
not be important for encouraging or reducing the risk of biotechno-
logical product development, while providing increased potential
for anticompetitive acts by larger companies.
A problem facing small competitors is that of predatory
litigation by larger companies.262 Since patent owners are allowed
to enforce their patent rights through litigation, a large company
may use the threat of litigation, or extended litigation, to frustrate
competitors.2 63 Such use of litigation acts to control a market and
suppress competition.264 It can also be a source of income for the
261 Id. at 793.
262 See generally Michael Paul Chu, An Antitrust Solution to the New Wave
of Predatory Patent Infringement Litigation, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1341,
1341 & n.3 (1992) (discussing the use by companies of patents as "swords to cut
down their competitors" in areas involving high-technology, including
"manufacturers of computers, semiconductors, and consumer electronics"). The
same problems will arise in biotechnology because both industries spend a great
deal on research and development, and the potential markets are large. See supra
notes 4-11 and accompanying text (describing research expenditures by several
companies in 1996).
263 See Chu, supra note 262, at 1341-42. For example, Texas Instruments
("TI") sued nine other corporations for alleged infringements of chip manufactur-
ing processes; TI garnered $191 million in 1987 from the actions. See Chu, supra
note 262, at 1341. Richard Agnich, senior vice president and general counsel of
TI considered litigation an "untapped resource" that TI had, until then, "been
underutilizing." Chu, supra note 262, at 1341.
264 Chu, supra note 262, at 1352. Such litigation can "force competitors to
pay higher royalties or even drive them out of the market completely." Chu,
supra note 262, at 1352. The cost of patent litigation can be quite high.
Litigation between Du Pont and Cetus over the polymerase chain reaction cost
Cetus approximately $3.2 million. See Pasahow, supra note 231, at 39. Litigation
between Xoma and Centocor cost both parties an aggregate of $12 million.
Pasahow, supra note 231, at 39.
Some costs, however, are not monetary. During the litigation between Xoma
and Centocor, both companies may have lost regulatory approval for their
disputed products because of testimony introduced at trial attacking the studies
supporting the patent applications. Pasahow, supra note 231, at 40. Also,
Genetics Institute, in losing litigation between itself and Genentech, was "unable
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large company. 265 Smaller companies on the receiving end suffer
burdensome legal costs, and are forced to divert precious research
funds to nonproductive uses.2 66 Innovation suffers, and monopoly,
already a strong tendency in the industry, is encouraged.267
The doctrine of equivalents, available to any plaintiff, can only
serve to encourage monopolization and predatory litigation because
it encourages a lack of clarity in the scope of claims, increasing the
potential for infringement by competitors developing products
similar to patented ones. Biotechnology, an industry with many
small players and a few large companies, may be particularly prone
to litigation of this type.268 Predatory litigation, however, would
be less of a threat if an assertion of infringement under the doctrine
were available only after a judge had reviewed the case and held
the assertion valid.
Aside from threats of litigation, the uncertainty introduced into
the scope of claims fostered by the doctrine acts to discourage
to continue its separate existence, and allowed itself to be acquired by American
Home Products." See Pasahow, supra note 231, at 40. Ironically, the uniformity
of patent interpretation brought about by the creation of the CAFC "actually
transformed the strongest protective aspects of the patent system into weapons
for offensive use against legitimate competition." Chu, supra note 262, at 1351-
52.
265 Chu, supra note 262, at 1352. "The mere defense of a patent and
challenge of an allegedly infringing device are no longer exclusive motivations.
... [F]irms recently have realized that huge damage awards in patent infringe-
ment suits can conveniently boost the trickle of royalties." Chu, supra note 262,
at 1352. One temptation for a firm bringing successful suits is to rely on such
suits as a source of income. Chu, supra note 262, at 1352.
266 Chu, supra note 262, at 1353. Litigation costs can be substantial burdens
to new companies. The cost of a preliminary court action may cost a company
$100,000, which may represent a year's profit for a smaller company. See
Murphy, supra note 231, at 4.
267 Pasahow, supra note 231, at 41. "[M]any biotechnology companies
believe that monopoly rights are necessary to justify the investment necessary to
develop and obtain approval for a therapeutic drug." Pasahow, supra note 231,
at 41 (paraphrasing the testimony of Kirk Raab, CEO of Genentech, before a
Congressional committee). The worth of a company may also depend heavily
upon an anticipated monopoly position. Pasahow, supra note 231, at 41.
268 See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text (describing the relative sizes
of public corporations in biotechnology).
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product development. While broad patents help protect investment,
"patent scope should not extend further than necessary to accom-
plish this objective, because patents restrict distribution of the
invention and reduce incentives to make improvements. 2 69 In
fact, one economic model of patents argues that, since biotech
companies derive funds from sources other than patented products,
"patent scope should be just broad enough to allow the inventor to
recover the cost of the inventions.""27
CONCLUSION
The biotech industry suffers under a confusing doctrine of
equivalents, whether a court applies the broad CAFC application or
the Supreme Court's element-by-element approach. Both
approaches act to confuse the interpretation of claims within
biotech patents, and therefore act to suppress competition and new
product development. However, the doctrine of equivalents serves
a useful purpose in protecting a patentee. The Supreme Court has
stated that "[t]he essence of the doctrine [of equivalents] is that one
may not practice a fraud on a patent. ,271 The best solution,
therefore, is to retain the doctrine, but as a purely equitable remedy
available in exceptional cases. Its potential availability will protect
patentees who have legitimate need of the doctrine's application,
while its limited use will reassert desired certainty into patents and
discourage nonmeritorious litigation.
269 Ko, supra note 260, at 793.
270 Ko, supra note 260, at 795. The model described is the "incentive-to-
invent" model of how patents stimulate innovation. Ko, supra note 260, at 791-
73. The theory balances incentive to innovate with burdens on other inventors by
suggesting that patent scope be broad enough to recover the cost of innovation,
but no more. Ko, supra note 260, at 795. Strictly applied, this model is
somewhat too restrictive, since profit is an acceptable and desirable goal of a free
market; nevertheless, it properly takes into account the negative effect overly
broad patents have on potential competitors. Ko, supra note 260, at 793.
271 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608
(1950).
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